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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78A-3-102(3)(j). It subsequently assigned the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals,
which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
U.C.A. § 72-5-104( 1) (2006): A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of
ten years.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Facts
Defendants are owners of vast tracts of real property located in Wasatch County.
(R. 419). The property is mountainous terrain separating the Wallsburg valley from state
and federal owned forested land. (R. 418-419). The property is traversed by several
interconnecting dirt roads, some of which provide the only vehicle access to several parts
of United States Forest Service land ("Forest land"). (R. 419-418). As found by the trial
court, the public has used these roads at-will for at least thirty years, starting in the 1960s.
(R. 413). Beginning in the late 1980s or early 1990s the Okelberrys began restricting
access to the roads. (R. 488). In 2001, the County filed an action in the Fourth Judicial
District Court to enforce the public's rights to use the roads. (R.10).
At trial, nine witnesses—a representative sampling of community users—testified
that beginning in the late 1950s thev used the roads without impediment or limitation by
the Okelberrvs or anyone. The roads were used bv the public to access several areas of
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Foiest land for recreational activities m which vehicles traveled the roads. (R. 682 pg.
102-103) For the areas of public land served by these roads, there is no other way for
vehicle access. These witnesses testified that they never requested or received permission
to use these roads, but used the roads whenever they wanted, regardless of the purpose
(R. 400) There was some testimony of sometimes seeing the Okelberrys or their
employees while using the roads prior to the 1990s (R 683 pg 122); however, none of
these witnesses were ever approached or stopped by the Okelberrys or their employees
(R.473).
At trial, these witnesses ako testified that throughout the Okelberry property there
w ere w ire livestock fences with w ire gates across the roads. However, these gates were
typically only closed when livestock were present on the Okelberry property. (R. 682 pg.
189). If the livestock were only in one area of the property, only the gates for that area
would be closed and the rest of the gates would be open. (R. 683 pg 232) During the
winter months, not only were the gates open, but the wire fences themselves were usually
let down and placed on the ground (R 684 pg 137-138)
The^e w itnesbes fuithei testified that they never saw any no-trespassmg signs or
any other signs or markers until the late 1980s or early 1990s (R 675) There was also
e\ idence that when the first signs were erected, some signs were placed inside the
Okelbeiry pioperty along and parallel to the roads indicating that although a person could
use the roads, travelers were not allowed to leave the roads and enter onto the
surrounding Okelberry property (R. 683 pg 71-72)

i

All of the witnesses called by the County testified that in all the years they used
these roads they never encountered a locked gate until the 1990s. (R. 675). The
w itnesses testified that they were always able to use the roads; their collective
uninterrupted use spanned o\er thirty years. (R. 413, 417).
In the earlv 1990s the Okleberrys started selling what they described as "trespass
permits" to persons who wranted to hunt on their property. The Okelberrys charged
individuals fifty dollars per person for permission to hunt on their land during the
appropriate seasons. Brian Okelberry testified that the one time he encountered someone
hunting on Okelberry property without a trespass permit, he did not kick him off, but
instead sold him a permit. (R. 684 pg. 35-36). Ray Okelberry stated that when they
started selling the trespass permits is when they started "this permission deal." (R. 684
pg. 86).
After selling the trespass permits for a year or two, the Okelberrys leased the
"hunting rights" on the property to United Sportsman, Inc, a hunting club, to be used by
club members. It was during these few years of trespass permits and the United
Sportsman lease that members of the public first started seeing no trespassing signs being
posted and locks installed on the gates. (R. 683 pg. 64-65).
Finalh, the property was placed into what is now called a "Cooperative Wildlife
Management Unit" ("CWMU"). In a CWMU, the operator works in conjunction with the
Department of Wildlife Resources ("DWR") to manage the wildlife on the property. (R.
416). In exchange for allowing the DWR to have a say in the management of the land for
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wildlife, the CWMU operator (and sometimes the landowner) is allowed to sell hunting
permits to individuals. (R. 683 pg. 228-229).
After a three-day bench trial, the district court found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that four of the roads at issue had become dedicated and abandoned to the
public pursuant to state law. (R. 413).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On remand from the Utah Supreme Court the trial court made further and more
specific findings in order to apply the new test articulated in this case for what is required
to interrupt pubic use under the dedication statute. After making those findings, the trial
court held that the roads in question had been dedicated to the public.
The trial court specifically found that the gates across these roads were not locked
prior to the late 1980s or early 1990s. It specifically found that the testimony from Ray
Okelberry, that he locked the before the 1990s, was not credible. The trial court further
found that any such locking that may have taken place was not intended to interrupt the
public use of the road. The finding regarding no intent to close public access was correct
since even those claims of locking gates was clearly intended for livestock control.
The trial court also properly held that the wire gates across these roads did not
constitute an act of interruption. The gates were in place when the Okelberrys bought the
property so they were not an overt act of the Okelbertys. Furthermore, the evidence
showed that the intent in using the gates was for livestock control.
The Okelberrys claim that the presence of gates limits the scope of the public
roads was not raised below and it should not be considered by the Court. Regardless, to
4

allow a road that meets the requirements for dedication to the public to be somehow
limited in scope defeats the purpose of the statute and is unworkable.
The trial court found that persons were at times asked to leave the Okelberry
propertv adjacent to the roads but were not stopped from using the roads. This finding is
supported by the testimony of Lee Okelberry that people could use the roads through
their property whether they requested permission or not and without any trouble at all.
The trial court's denial of the Okelberrys' motion for new trial or to present
additional evidence was also correct. The intent of the Okelberrys regarding these roads
was clear at trial and the court expressly found that persons were freely allowed to used
the roads during the relevant time periods. This evidence was sufficient to support the
trial court's holding on this motion
The evidence in this case spans fifty years. It is clear that there was a change in
the Okelberrys' dealings with these roads which went from making no effort to control
the roads for thirty years to trying to completely cut off public access. However, as
found by the trial court the roads had already become dedicated public roads.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT'S RECENT TEST ARTICULATED IN THIS
CASE

In its recent opinion in Wasatch County v. Okelbeny, 2008 UT 10, «j 15, the Utah
Supreme Court articulated a new test to apply when determining whether a public road
was used continuously by the public for ten years or whether the use was interrupted by
the property owner; thereby restarting the ten year requirement of continuous use for a
5

road dedication. In that opinion, the Court said, "[A]n overt act that is intended by a
property owner to interrupt the use of a road as a public thoroughfare, and is reasonablycalculated to do so constitutes an interruption sufficient to restart the running of the
required ten year period under the Dedication Statute." Id.
As noted by the trial court in its Further Specific Findings of Fact and Riding on
Defendants ' Motion for Entry of Supplemental Findings and Conclusions; or
Alternatively for New Trial or Presentation of Additional Evidence (hereinafter, "Further
Specific Findings"), the new test has three elements. First, the property owner must have
performed an act. Second, the act must be intended to interrupt the use of the road.
Third, the act must be reasonably calculated to interrupt the use of the road. (R. 672).
Fortunately, the Court did not pronounce a new test without providing direction.
At the time the Court decided Okelberry, there were two other "companion cases"
dealing with road dedication. These cases were Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11
and Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12. In both Prisbrey and Butler, the Utah Supreme
Court applied the new test articulated in Okelbeny. In fact, in Butler, the Court noted
that Butler had failed to marshal the facts, as required when challenging the factual
findings of a lower court, and as a result the Court would normally decline to review the
issue. However, noting the new standard set forth in Okelbeny, the Court elected "to
exercise [its] discretion and review the merits of [Butler's] arguments regarding
continuous use in order to elucidate this standard by applying it to specific facts." Butler,
2008 UT 12 at <j 12. A review of the holdings in Butler and Prisbrey will show that on
remand the trial court correctly applied the new standard set forth in Okelberry.
6

A.

Review o£ Town of Leeds v. Pnsbrex

The Prisbrey decision is important because it shows that a single qualifying act is
enough to restart the ten year continuous use requirement under the dedication statute.
In Prisbrey, the trial court found that the public had used the road in question for thirty
years. Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11, f | 4. However, on six occasions within
that time period the owner of the property, a Mrs. George, had physically blocked the
road with sawhorses and manned the blocked road with either herself or her sons for
twenty-four continuous hours. Id. f 3. The trial court found that Mrs. George effected
the blockade with the specific intent and for the specific reason of retaining private
ownership of the road. Id.%1.
On review, the Court found that blocking the roadway for twenty-four continuous
hours was a sufficient method of interrupting public use of the roadway. Further because
the intent to interrupt continuous use existed, the roads had not become dedicated to the
public.
B.

Review of Utah County v. Butler

Butler is important to the case at bar because it shows that a landowner must have
the necessary intent for an act to interrupt the public use of the road. Like the case at bar,
Butler involved issues pertaining to the existence of gates, gates being locked at times,
the placement of no trespassing signs, and allegations of people being asked to leave
private property. Butler, 2008 LT 12, *}5-6. Also, there were allegations of irrigation water
and snow on the road at times making it impassable. Id *j 5-6.
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In Butler, the trial court found that the acts of locking gates, kicking persons off of
the property, placement of signs, and using the road to deliver irrigation water did occur.
Id. *[ 6. However, the trial court also found that each of the claimed interruptions failed to
disrupt continuous use, and specifically held that none of the acts which had occurred
were intended to interrupt the use of the road by the public. Id. ^f 16-17. In applying the
standard established in Okelbeny, the Court held that despite the fact that some actual
interruptions were found by the trial court, the road was still dedicated to the public. Id.
The Court held that the lack of the necessary intent when locking gates, placing signs, or
delivering irrigation and the ejecting of persons from the property adjacent to the road
rendered those acts insufficient to interrupt continuous use. Id.
In the case at bar, the Okelberrys presented evidence regarding some of the same
facts found in the Butler case, namely the existence of gates, locking of gates, asking
persons to leave the property, and the erection of no trespassing signs. (R. 672-673).
However, this evidence was properly found by the trial court to either be unreliable or not
credible, and lacking the necessary intent to interrupt the public use of the roads.
Regardless, the Okelberrys' purported interruptive acts failed to satisfy the standard
articulated in Okelbeny and clarified in Prisbrey and Butler.
C.

The Trial Court Did Not Find the E\ idence of Locked Gates Prior to the
Late 1980s or Earlv 1990s Credible

One of the issues argued in this case prior to remand was whether the trial court
had made a finding that the gates across the roads at issue in this case had been locked
prior to the fate 1980s or early 1990's. After articulating the new standard of what would
8

constitute an interruptive act in this type of case, the Supreme Court noted that "factual
questions remain as to whether and when such an event or events occurred." Okelbeny,
2008 UT 10. *}19. This was clearly one of the factual issues to be determined on remand
and as required the trial court resolved this issue.
In its Further Specific Findings the trial court clarified its earlier findings
regarding locked gates by finding that there was no credible evidence of locked gates
prior to the late 1980s or early 1990s. The trial court noted that the evidence of such an
act as locking gates had to be credible in order to constitute an overt act. (R. 670). The
trial court then made detailed findings of why the evidence of locked gates prior to the
late 1980s or early 1990s was not credible. (R. 670). Those reasons included self interest
of the witness and the fact that the evidence was contradicted by virtually all of the
witnesses called by the Plaintiff or the Defendants. (R. 670). The trial court further
clarified its findings by expressly holding that to the extent Ray Okelberry's testimony
contradicted the testimony of Lee OkelbeiTy and Brian Okelberry on the issue of locking
gates, the testimony of Ray Okelberry was not credible. (R. 670). Or stated differently,
the trial court found that the gates were not locked prior to sometime in the late 1980s or
1990s, as testified to by Brian Okleberry and Lee Okelberry and supported by all of the
testimony of Plaintiffs witnesses. The trial court went even further and noted that any
locking of gates that actually may have occurred lacked the requisite intent necessary to
interrupt continuous use as articulated in Okleberry and clarified in Butler.
D.

For the Sake of Argument, Even if the Trial Court had Found Some
Locking of Gates. Such Acts Lacked the Requisite Intent to Qualify as an
Interrupts e Act
9

Even if the trial court's Further Specific Findings could be construed to have
found that the gates v\ere locked at some time prior to the late 1980s, the trial court
correctly held that such acts lacked the requisite intent to constitute an interruptive act.
In the standard articulated b> the Supreme Court in Okelberry, the first part of the test
requires tw[a]n overt act that is intended by a property owner to interrupt the use of a road
as a public thoroughfare" Okelbeny, 2008 UT 10, % 15. Ostensibly, in order to intend to
disrupt continuous use of road by the public, one must know that the road is being used
by the public, know that the public use must be interrupted to stop the road from
becoming public, and then act with intent to interrupt the public use.
The trial court specifically found that even if those acts claimed by the Okelberrys
had taken place, they were not intended to interrupt the public use of the road. In fact, at
trial one of the Okelberrys' arguments was that during the 1950s and 1960s and even into
the 1970s there was not any use of the roads by the public. It would be impossible for
them to intend to interrupt the use of the road by the public when they were not aware
such use was even happening.
E.

The Okelberrvs* Sufficiency of Evidence Argument Must Fail
1.

The Okelberrvs Failed to Marshal the Evidence

Although not listed in their questions presented, the Okleberrys make a sufficiency
of evidence argument in their brief with respect to the trial court's finding that they
lacked the intent to lock the gates in order to interrupt the use of the road by the public. It
is important to note that this argument presumes a finding by the trial court that the gates
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were locked at some time at least everv ten years. However, the trial court expressly
found the ev idence of locked gates as not credible. Nevertheless, for the sake of
argument, even if the trial court had found from Ray Okelberry's testimony that he
sometimes locked gates was credible, the Okelberrys, sufficiency of evidence argument
must fail.
In Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ^ 53, the Supreme Court held, "In order to
challenge a court's factual findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in
support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below."
This requires the party to present, in "comprehensive and fastidious order, eveiy scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant
resists." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App.
1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Where evidence is inadequately marshaled,
the court is to assume "that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." Chen
v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^f 19. In their sufficiency of evidence argument, the Okelberrys
have failed to make any effort at marshalling. Therefore, this court should hold that the
finding that the Okelberrys lacked the intent to lock the gates in order to interrupt the use
of the road by the public is in fact supported bv sufficient evidence on that basis.
2.

There was Sufficient Evidence for the Trial Court's Holding on
Intent

Even had the Okelberrvs properly marshaled the evidence as required to argue that
issue, the trial court was still correct in its finding that any such locking of gates lacked
11

the intent required under Okelberry. This can best be seen in the testimony of Ray
Okelberry. At trial, the following testimony was given by Ray Okleberry:
A. The first gate, yes. That's the first gate I locked, Circle. I had the sheep
ready to go and somebody left the gate opened and trespassed on the Forest
Service. 1 brought them back and locked the sate.
Q. Now when you say the other gate, was that the gate that goes - The
1080 Gate, is that the one that goes onto the Ridge Line Road?
A. That's Right, and those big pines. I locked that. We had two bands of
sheep, as [ stated before. One was on the one side of that fence, the middle
division fence, and one was on the other. It was my responsibility that, for
the ranch and the Okelberrys, to get the sheep over there. I had had
problems and I wasn't going to have any problems. I locked them.
(R.684 pg. 136). Ray Okelberry is stating that the reason he claimed to have locked some
gates wras so the sheep would not get out. It had nothing to do with interrupting the
public's use of the road. The fact that such testimony of locking the gates is in direct
contradiction to his earlier testimony that during those years he virtually never saw
members of the public on these roads gives further basis for the trial court's finding that
such evidence was not credible. (R. 684 pg 65-67). The lack of intent to close these
roads to the public is further shown in the collective testimony of Ray Okelberry where
he never states that he or his family was making an effort to keep the roads private. Even
more telling is his statement that once they started selling trespass permits was the time
thev started "this permission deal," (R. 684 pg. 86).
II.

THE EXISTENCE OF GATES DID NOT QUALIFY AS AN
INTERRLPTIVE ACT
After an extensive search, Wasatch County has found no Utah case law that has

held that the presence of gates alone interrupts the continuous use of a road by the public
12

under the dedication statute. In Wasatch County's search, the significance of an
unlocked gate alone as an interruptive force in the context of section 72-5-104 has not yet
been addressed by any appellate court in Utah. Some cases have, as pointed out by the
Okelberrys, addressed the presence of gates without indicating whether the gates were
locked. However, the language of the opinions indicates that likely these gates were in
fact locked. See e.g., AWINC Corp., 2005 UT App 168, ^ 3 (noting that "[t]he gates
prevented use" of the road); Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 914 (Utah App. 1996)
(finding the gate prevented use of the road). A gate that is unlocked hardly prevents the
public's access to and use of any particular road.
There are good reasons why the trial court's holding that the presence of gates
across these roads did not constitute an interruptive event is correct and should not be
disturbed.
A.

No Overt Act Was Performed by the Okelberrys

First, as noted by the trial court, there was no overt act of the Okelberrys to place
gates across the roads. The evidence at trial was that the boundary gates were already
present when the Okelberrys purchased the property. (R. 684 pg. 62-63). Because the
gates were already present the Okelberrys did not perform an overt act, a necessary
element of the standard set forth by the Supreme Court.
B.

The Gates Were Not Intended to Interrupt the Public Use of the Road

Second, the Okleberrys' intent in using the gates was clear at trial. The evidence
was that the gates were used to contain livestock. Brian Okelberry testified that the
pmpose of the gates was to keep the sheep together and on the Okelberry propertv. Only
13

after persistent, leading questioning by his own attorney did he agree that perhaps the
gates were to control use of the road by the public. (R. 684 pg. 25). Keeping the sheep
on the property was necessary because if the sheep were to wander off the property the
Okelberrys would be fined by the Forest Service. (R. 683 pg. 135). Lee Okelberry
testified that cattle guards were put in because the wire gates would sometimes get cut off
or rolled back, indicating that the purpose of the gates was livestock control. (R. 683 pg.
198).
The fact that these gates were for livestock control is further shown by the
evidence that the gates were only closed when there was livestock on the property. For
instance, Martin Wall testified that "if there was no stock in there [the gates] would be
down." (R. 682 pg. 189). Ed Sabey similarly testified that the gates are not always up
and that "once the sheep and cattle is gone [the gates] were hardly put up, ever .. . ." (R.
682 pg. 271, 292). Shane Ford, an Okelberry witness, testified that the gates would be
open or closed, depending on which pasture the sheep were in. (R. 683 pg. 232). Lee
Okelberry also testified that the gates were not up at all times during the summer. (R.
683 pg. 97). Ray Okelberry testified that the sheep would be on the property from May
to June and would return at the end of September. (R. 684 pg. 69-70). Gerald Thompson
testified that sometimes the gates were open and at other times they were closed. (R. 682
pg. 244). Brandon Richins similarly testified that sometimes the gates were up and
sometimes they were not. (R. 683 pg. 12,25). The evidence clearly supported the trial
court's holding that the gates were intended to control the livestock and that there was no
intent to interrupt use of the road.
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C.
For the Sake Of Argument, Even if the Gates Had Been Intended to
Interrupt Access. Thev v\ere not Reasonably Calculated to do so.
The gates present during the relevant time periods do not convey or show intent to
interrupt the public use of the roads. The gates used were wire fence gates. This type of
gate does not send a message to "keep out." There is a significant difference between a
wire gate on a wire fence in rural sheep and cattle country and a wrought-iron gate on a
fence around a person's back yard. Each sends a completely different message. In this
case the gates were clearly livestock gates on livestock fences.1 The message sent by
these gates is one of livestock control, not to keep out. Considering that the roads run
through sheep country, it would be incongruous to allow wire livestock gates to serve as a
reasonably calculated act of interruption. This is even more apparent when put in the
proper context. In the thirty plus years that these roads have been used by the public
many things have changed. Wasatch County was much more agriculturally based than it
is currently. There were fewer people, more farms, and more livestock. People,
especially in these outlying areas which are even now considered rural, were accustomed
to seeing and using livestock gates. Cattle guards were much less prevalent than in
today's world. A gate simply did not have the same meaning it may have today. And it
was in this environment that these roads were dedicated to the public, developing into
well-used, continuous, and necessary access to Forest Service and other public lands.

!

It is true that in recent years, the Okleberrys did intend to interrupt public use by closing
and locking their gates. They also replaced the wire gate with an iron gate on at least
one road (the main road into the property), but this was long after the roads had become
dedicated to the public under the statute. It does show that when the Okleberrys did
intend to interrupt public use, they knew how to do it.
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Further, e\en currently under Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106, a county may authorize
a person to keep unlocked gates on Class B and D public roads. For a member of the
public accustomed to seeing gates across all types of roads, even public roads, the
presence of a wire livestock gate across a road in rural livestock grazing areas did not and
does not send a message that a person cannot use the road. Even had the Okelberrys
intended for the gates to interrupt the public use, they would not have been reasonably
calculated to do so.
The trial court properly found that the presence of gates across these roads did not
interrupt the public use. They were not an overt act by the landowner, they were not
intended to interrupt public use, and, even had they been an act of the Okelberrys
intended to interrupt public use of the roads, they were not reasonably calculated to do so.
III.

THE EXISTENCE OF GATES CANNOT LIMIT THE SCOPE OF WHAT
IS DEDICATED TO THE PUBLIC
The Okelberrys also argue that the existence of gates limits the scope of the public

road dedication. Their argument is that a road dedication includes a tacit intention of the
landowner to give the road to the public. They further argue that the presence of gates
limits the amount or the scope of that gift leaving the public only with what was given.
As support for this argument they cite the Louisiana case of Vaughn v. Williams, 345
So.2d 1195 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
A.

This Issue was Not Raised Below

This argument was not raised or preserved below by the Okelberrys. Because they
fail to make either of these showings, this issue should not be considered. See. DeBiy v.
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Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (holding that arguments not raised below are not
considered by the Court).
B.

When a Road is Dedicated it Must Become a Complete Public Road.

In Utah, although the consent of the Landowner was at one time a necessary
element for a road dedication, it no longer is. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307,
311 (Utah 1997). Rather, under Utah's dedication statute, a road is dedicated by the use
of the public and inaction on the part of a landowner. This is supported by the Supreme
Court's new standard for interruption of the continuous use element. Under that
standard, a landowner cannot interrupt continuous use by merely showing that he did not
intend to dedicate a public road. Instead he must show that he acted with the specific
intent to not allow a dedication of the road.
If a landowner were allowed to use this 'limited gift" argument to limit the scope
of a road properly dedicated under the dedication statute, that same argument could and
would be used regarding every aspect of roads so dedicated. For example, a landowner
may argue that he tacitly gave only a dirt road and thus it can never be paved. Or a
landowner may argue that he tacitly only allowed use when he was not using the roadway
to deliver irrigation water and thus he can flood the public road with water when desired."
Further, a landowner may argue that he tacitly only allowed eight feet of the road to be
used by the public and thus there is only an eight foot v\ide public road that can ne\er be
increased. Such a result would be absurd.

2

See Utah County v Butler, 2008 LT 12.«; 6,
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When a road is dedicated to the public, it must become a public road where the
highway authority has the same ability and powers to govern and use it in the public's
best interest as with any other public road.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE OKELBERRYS EJECTED
PERSONS FOUND ON THE PROPERTY ADJACENT TO THE ROAD
BUT NOT THE ROAD ITSELF IS CORRECT.
The trial court found that the testimony at trial showed '"that the Okelberrys and

their employees have at various times asked persons to leave the property surrounding
the roads" (R. 488) (emphasis added). It its Further Specific Findings, the trial court did
not modify that finding, rather it found that the Okelberrys allowed persons to freely use
these roads. (R. 673). The evidence presented at trial supports the trial courts' findings
that the public's use of these roads was without permission, but freely allowed by the
Okelberrys.
A.

The Public's Use of the Road Was Not by Permission.

The Okelberrys argue that there was evidence that at times they granted
permission to some people to use their land and on other occasions expelled some people
found on the land. They argue that this evidence shows an effort to control access to the
roads and should be considered to meet the standard for an act that inteirupted public use.
However, even a cursory review of that evidence shows why the trial court properly
found that ev idence to not constitute an interruption of continuous use.
First, virtually all the grants of permission given by the Okelberrys were to either
allow hunting or camping or somehow use the Okelberry property, not merely to use the
roads. There was no credible evidence during the relevant time period before the late
18

1980s or 1990s of anvone requesting pemiission to use only the roads, it was always to
use the property through which the roads traverse.
Second, virtually all of the evidence of permission happened after the late 1980s or
early 1990s, after everyone agreed that the Okelbenys started to restrict use of the roads
and property. {See, e.g., R. 684 pg. 83-84) (written permission slip allowing use of roads
and land, dated 8/31/2000).
Conversely, all of the witnesses called by the County testified to using the roads
for decades without any permission. (E.g., R. 682 pg. 190) (testimony of Martin Wall,
who first used the roads in the 1950's, stating that he never asked for nor received
permission to use the roads); {see also R. 683 pg. 141) (testimony of Okelberrys'
employee, Jeff Jefferson, who stated that the majority of people he approached on the
Okelberry property were there without permission).
B.

The Evidence of Requesting People to Leave Was About People Who Were
Off of The Roads and On the Property Adjacent To The Roads

The credible testimony offered by the Okelberry witnesses regarding ejecting
persons from their property were instances of persons found off of the road using the
Okelberry property in ways the Okleberrys did not approve. The record has several
detailed examples of occasions where persons found off of the road on the Okelberry
property adjacent to the road were asked to leave. However, there was no testimony
showing one specific instance where a non-permissive user of the roads had been
expelled, simply for using the roads.
For instance, Ray Okelberry testified that he once left a note at a camp, sometime
19

within the last 20 years, advising the occupant that he or she was trespassing on private
property. (R. 684 pg. 82). The camp, and its occupant, had been there for more than a
week and were on the Okelberry property—not the road—and were in fact trespassing.
See Defendant's Exhibit 27.3 (R. 683 pg. 122). Ray Okelberry did not testify to
expelling anyone from the area other than the instance where he left the note at the camp,
as discussed above. (R. 684 pg. 82). Brian OkeIberr> similarly testified that he could not
recall asking anyone to leave the property—and thus presumably also the roads. (R. 684
pg. 41).
In their brief, the Okelberrys cite the testimony of Lee Okelberry to claim that he
routinely questioned persons he found using the road. Okelberry Brief at 22-23. In fact,
Lee Okelberry testified that he could not recall asking anyone to leave during the 1950s
or 1960s. (R. 683 pg. 184-85). His only descriptions of asking anyone to leave
concerned use of the property—not the roads. When asked whether be believed the roads
were open for use by the public, he stated, "There was no consideration for the use of the
public or nothing else with the Forest Service. Anybody that had any business in there
could get through the road without any trouble at all." (R. 683 pg. 204). When asked
whether the public had to ask to use the roads, he stated, "If there was any that needed to
go through there in any way, shape or form they could ask or thev could go through
there." (R. 683 pg. 205) (emphasis added). Clearly, Lee Okelberry was not stopping

3

There was one instance where an employee, Jeff Jefferson, testified that he asked Mark
Butters and his brother to leave the roads. But he admitted that this happened in 2002 or
2003 long after the relevant time period. Even the County admitted that the Okelberrys
had begun blocking these roads by this time. (R. 683 pg. 150).
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people and asking them their "business." As he stated, there wasn't any consideration
needed for anyone to use the roads. If anyone did ask he had no problem, or if they just
used the roads there was no "trouble at all." During Lee Okelberry* s time, the roads were
open for anyone to use. Lee Okelberry's testimony that that he had never turned anyone
away who had business on the public lands did not mean that he was monitoring the use
of these roads. (R. 683 pg. 205).
There was also testimony from a friend of the Okelberrys and an employee of the
Okelberrys regarding asking persons to leave the property. Bruce Huvard, an Okelberry
friend, testified that the Okelberrys authorized him to ask non-permissive users to leave
the property and roads. (R. 683 pg. 266). This friend, who only frequented Okelberry
property during some hunting seasons, did not provide any examples or dates for his
assertion that he had in fact asked anyone to leave the Okelberry roads, other than when
he became involved in leasing the land in the mid-1990's. (R. 683 pg. 255-56). Jeff
Jefferson, an Okelberry employee, testified that per Okelberry policy if he saw someone
on the property he would ask them to leave. (R. 683 pg. 141). The following discussion
with Jefferson took place during cross-examination:
A: Well, most of the time when people came on there they wouldn't stay on the
road.
Q: So people you talked to were people that were off the road on property, is that
what you're saying?
A: No - - Yeah, Vd run into people like that and on the road. And Ld ask them if
they're suppose to be on there.
(R. 683 pg. 149). However, none of the Okelberrys testified to the existence of any

21

policy regarding the expulsion of individuals either on the road or the property. Jeff
Jefferson's testimony essentially was that he would ask people to leave the Okelberry
property. It was only when pressed that he added the catchall "and on the road"
statement. (R. 683 pg. 148-49).
The trial court found that the testimony at trial showed "that the Okelberrys and
their employees have at various times asked persons to leave the property surrounding
the roads" ( R. 488). (emphasis added). It its further supplemental findings, the trial
court did not modify those findings. The trial court was correct in its holding that ejection
of trespassers from adjacent land does not interrupt the continuous use of the roads
themselves. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that individuals were not
ejected solely for using the roads, but that before the 1990s the Okelberrys freely
intended to let others use the roads. (R. 673).
C.

Even Had the Court Found that Persons Were Kicked Off the Roads Solely
For Using the Roads, Any Such Acts Were Neither Intended to Disrupt the
Use of the Road by the Public Nor Reasonably Calculated to Do So.

Even if the trial court had found that members of the public found simply using
the roads were asked to leave by the Okelberrys or their employees, such actions would
not have qualified as an interruptive act under the Court's new standard. The Okelberry
witnesses who testified to performing such an act were Bruce Huvard, a friend of the
Okelberrys, and Jeff Jefferson, an employee of the Okelberrys. As stated above, both of
these witnesses claimed to have been asked by the Okelberrys to perform such acts.
However, none of the Okelberrys, all of whom testified of acts when they expelled
persons from the property, ever talked about expelling persons from the roads or about
n

creating a policy of expelling persons from the road. Even if Mr. Hu\ard and Mr.
Jefferson e\er ejected someone using only the road, such instances were gratuitous acts,
not acts sanctioned by the Okelberrys for any specific purpose. Such acts would have
lacked the necessary intent to interrupt the use of the roads by the public.
Finally, even if such acts had been found to have occurred with the intent to
interrupt public use, the act of occasionally asking a person to leave the Okelberry
property is not reasonably calculated to interrupt the use of the road. Though it may
disrupt that person's use of the road, it does not send any message to the general public
that the roads are private.
V.

THE COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO
PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE WAS CORRECT
The Okelberrys also question the trial court's denial of their motion for a new trial

or to reopen the case and allow additional evidence. The basis of their argument is that
the new standard articulated by the Supreme Court resurrected the element of intent as a
necessary element to determine road dedication, and that considering this new test or
standard, they should be allowed to present evidence specifically focused on that test.
As noted by this Court in A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen
Const., 977 P.2d 518, 524 (Utah App. 1999), the standard of review for a motion for a
new trial is abuse of discretion. In Aspen, the Court stated, "It lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court to grant a motion to reopen for the purpose of taking
additional testimony after the case has been submitted but prior to entry of judgment."
Id. (citing Leu is v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976)). However, in an unpublished
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case, this Court has also stated, "We review the trial court's decision on a motion for a
new trial for an abuse of discretion and we reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for
the decision." Ranson v. DiPaolo, 2008 UT App 65 (quoting and citing Balderas v. Starks,
2006 UT App 218, % 13, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah
1991)(internal punctuation omitted).
In the case at bar, there was certainly a reasonable basis for the trial court's denial
of the Okelberrys' motion to reopen the case for additional evidence or for a new trial.
At the trial, the Okelberrys did their best to try and show that they intended to
disrupt the use of these roads by the public.

At trial and all along, the Okelberrys have

argued that any interruption however caused and however brief should preclude a finding
of continuous use. To support this argument the Okelberrys tried to introduce every
piece of evidence that could to show they intended to control these roads. One very good
example referenced above was when Okelberrys' counsel asked owner and defendant,
Brian Okelberry, twice in succession, whether one of the purposes of the gates was to
keep people from using the roads. (R. 684 pg. 25). The fact that he had to ask such a
pointed, leading question two times to his own client in order to get the response he
wanted (even then, hesitantly), shows that the defense was very focused on trying to
show an intent to interrupt public use of this road.4 It is somewhat disingenuous for the
Okelberrys to now say that, even though they took every opportunity to show any and
every conceivable interruption of the use of these roads, including leading questions to
4

It also shows that the trial court was correct in not finding evidence garnered in such a
way to be credible evidence.
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illicit evidence of intent to close the roads to the public, had they only known intent was
an issue they would have shown evidence of their intent to stop public use.
The trial court did not merely find a "silenf lack of intent on the part of the
Okelberrys to close the roads due to insufficient evidence. To the contrary, the court
specifically found just the opposite. The trial court found that prior to the 1990s the
Okelberrys intended to freely let the public use the roads. (R. 673). This use was without
restriction and whether or not any member of the public had permission.
The reality is that this new standard of what is necessary to interrupt continuous
use does not change what evidence a party in Defendant's position would try and in fact
did try to present at trial. Rather, it only gives this court a slightly different measuring
stick to measure that evidence. The trial court was well within its discretion in denying
the Okelberrys' motion for a new trial or to introduce additional evidence. In fact it was
the correct decision. The test articulated by the Supreme Court should not change the
finding of dedication. Nor is it a basis for granting a new trial or reopening the trial to
take additional evidence.
For the sake of argument, even if further evidence were needed in this matter, it
would be wrong to require a completely new trial. This trial took place approximately
four years ago. Some of the witnesses brought by Wasatch County were elderly even
then. Witnesses may have moved or otherwise be unavailable. If this Court were to
believe it absolutely necessary to take additional ev idence, the case should be reopened
rather than having a completely new trial.
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As a result the trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion and based its decision
on a reasonable basis.
VI.

THE OKELBERRYS EFFECTIVELY CONCEDED THEIR CLAIM THAT
SIGNS WERE AN INTERRUPTIVE ACT
Although the issue regarding erection of no trespassing or keep out signs is

discussed in the Okelberrys' brief in the statement of facts section, that issue is not listed
in their statement of issues or included in the argument section of their brief. The
Okelberrys appear to have conceded their argument that no trespassing or keep out signs
were an interruptive act. This is instructive in that the evidence at trial was that signs
appeared around the time that the gates began to be locked and people were ejected from
the roads. (R. 673). The evidence from the witness brought by the County and the
witness of the Okelberrys correspond directly regarding the timing of these events.
During the early 1990s when the Okelberrys testified that they began the "whole
permission deal" by selling trespass permits and placing the property into the hunting
club and CWMU is exactly the same time that the witness brought by the County testified
that they first saw any no trespassing signs or locked gates. (R. 413).
One of the aspects of this case v\hich sometimes seems to be overlooked is that
there is o\er fifty years of history regarding these roads. Often in the limitations of an
appellate review it seems that the evidence is somewhat less clear than it was at trial. In
this case, all parties agree that in the late 1980s or early 1990s the Okelberrys took
affirmative acts which were intended to interrupt the use of the road. They began to lock
the gates. They began to post no trespassing signs on the road and generally acted to
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close the roads to the public. At trial, there was a lot of testimony from the Okelberrys
and their witnesses of their intent and the steps the> took to keep people off the roads and
the land. There was testimony of locks torn off gates and gates torn off of fences. There
was testimony regarding people being asked to leave the property and of people asking
permission to use the property. There was testimony regarding the existence of no
trespassing signs on the roads, even testimony of angry confrontations. However, almost
all of that evidence, when pinned down, was to events that took place after 1990. Even
the witness brought by Wasatch County agreed that those events happened after 1990.
Nevertheless, it was clear to the trial court as seen in its findings and ruling that
those actions and the intent behind those actions came about in the late 1980s or early
1990s. At trial, it was clear to the court that this change in policy by the Okelberrys was
as complete as it was dramatic. In light of this evidence and presentation, the trial court
properly found that the Okelberrys' intent prior to the 1990s was to freely allow the use
of the roads by the public.
It is this type of factual situation that has resulted in a standard of review for road
dedication that allows a large degree of deference to the trial court's ruling in applying
the facts to the law. This has not changed by the new standard of what interrupts public
use under the dedication statute. As noted in Wasatch County v. Okelbeny, 2008 UT 10,

An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal interpretation of the
Dedication Statute for correctness and its factual findings for clear error.
But whether the facts of a case satisfy the requirements of the Dedication
Statute is a mixed question of fact and law that involves various and
complex facts, evidentiary resolutions, and credibility determinations.
27

Thus, an appellate court reviews "a trial court's decision regarding whether
a public highway has been established under [the Dedication Statute] .. .
for correctness but grant[s] the court significant discretion in its application
of the facts to the statute." (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly found that there were no acts which interrupted the public
use of the road under the Supreme Court's new standard. For almost thirty years, the
public was allowed to freely use these roads without permission or restriction. During
that time the gates were not locked, people were not stopped from using the roads and the
presence of gates was not intended nor reasonably calculated to interrupt the use of the
roads by the public. The decision of the trial court should thus be affirmed.
Dated this i j _ day of June, 2009.
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APPENDIX A
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, 179P.3d 768
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
%1
In this case and two companion cases that we also
decide today,1 we consider the operation of Utah Code section 725-104(1) (the "Dedication Statute")/ which provides as follows:
"A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public
when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a
1

Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11,
County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12,
P.3d

P.3d

; Utah

period of ten years."2 We granted certiorari in this case to
consider whether the court of appeals erred in its application of
the standard for ascertaining continuous use as a public
thoroughfare under this statute. We conclude that it did so err.
We reverse and remand for the entry of specific findings of fact
relevant to the standard we announce today and for an application
of that standard.
BACKGROUND
\2
In 1957, Roy Okelberry and his sons, E. Ray and Lee,
purchased a large tract of land (the "Property") in Wasatch
County near Wallsburg, Utah. E. Ray and Lee later acquired their
father's interest in the Property. Sometime thereafter, Lee sold
his interest in the Property to E. Ray and E. Ray's sons, Brian
and Eric. E. Ray, Brian, and Eric Okelberry (the "Okelberrys")
currently own the Property and use it for their livestock
operations.
f3
Several unimproved mountain roads cross the Property,
all of which begin and end (or connect with roads that begin and
end) at points outside of it. Four of these roads are at issue
in this case: Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, Parker
Canyon Road, and Ridge Line Road (collectively, the "Four
Roads") .3 When Roy, E. Ray, and Lee Okelberry purchased the
Property in 1957, fences on its east and south sides separated it
from United States Forest Service property, and wire gates along
these fences controlled access to the Four Roads, requiring
persons entering or exiting the Property to open the gates before
proceeding.
f4
In 2001, Wasatch County filed a Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment and Quiet Title against the Okelberrys, the
Utah Division of Wildlife Resources,4 and West Daniels Land
Association,5 seeking to have the Four Roads declared dedicated

2

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001).

3

The underlying lawsuit also included Maple Canyon Road.
The trial court found that this road had not been dedicated and
abandoned to the public. Neither party appealed this decision,
and we do not address it here.
4

Wasatch County settled its dispute with the Utah Division
of Wildlife Resources in 2003.
5

Portions of Ridge Line Road and Parker Canyon Road
(continued...)
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2

and abandoned to the use of the public pursuant to Utah Code
section 72-5-104.6 During a three-day bench trial, Wasatch
County presented several witnesses who testified that they had
used the Four Roads without the Okelberrys' permission for
recreational purposes during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. These
witnesses also testified that although there were gates on the
roads, their use of the roads was unrestricted. The Okelberrys
presented evidence and testimony that members of the public had
not had unrestricted access to the roads, but that the gates on
the roads had been locked, at least occasionally, as early as the
late 1950s and that "No Trespassing/' "Keep Out," or "Private"
signs were posted. The Okelberrys testified that they had given
permission to a large number of people in the community to use

5

(...continued)
traverse property owned by West Daniels Land Association (the
"Association") immediately adjacent to the Property. The
Okelberrys are members and shareholders in the Association and
use the Association's land, together with their own, for grazing
livestock. The Association initially made an appearance through
counsel, but counsel later withdrew and no successor was
appointed. Wasatch County thereafter sought default summary
judgment against the Association. The Okelberrys opposed this
motion, arguing that as members of the Association they had "a
vested interest to see that no judgment is entered in this matter
on behalf of the plaintiff" and that, at trial, they "will
present evidence that there are no established roads across the
property of [the] Association." For reasons that are unclear
from the record, the trial court did not enter a ruling on
Wasatch County's default judgment motion prior to trial. In its
posttrial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court
noted that the Association's "default was entered," but that the
Okelberrys had been allowed to submit "[ejvidence regarding the
use of those portions of the roads at issue which are located in
[the] Association's property" at trial. The trial court made its
determinations regarding the Four Roads without distinguishing
between the Okelberrys' property and the Association's property.
We likewise do not distinguish between the properties and refer
only to the interests of the Okelberrys because the parties have
not appealed this issue.
6

An earlier version of this statute was in effect at the
time Wasatch County claims the Four Roads were dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-1289 (1995). A 1998 amendment to the earlier version renumbered
this section but made no substantive changes to it. 1998 Utah
Laws 861. We therefore refer to the current version of the
statute throughout this opinion.
3
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their roads and Property and had sold trespass and hunting
permits. And witnesses testified that the Okelberrys, in the
mid-1990s, placed their Property in a cooperative wildlife
management unit for use as a private hunting unit. The
Okelberrys and their employees testified that when they
encountered persons on the Property or roads without express
permission to be there, they asked them to leave.
%5
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and, later,
supplemental findings of fact
The trial court found "that there
was no public use of the various roads in the 1940s or before and
also that no evidence of vehicular use prior to the 1950s
existed." The court recognized that there were gates on the
roads that the Okelberrys or their employees locked w [a]t various
times in the past," but found that they were locked "on a more
permanent basis" beginning in the early 1990s. In addition, the
court found that w [p]rior to the gates being locked, the
existence of the gates did not interrupt the public's use of the
roads."
%6
follows:

In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court stated as
Taking even the [Okelberrys'] factual
assertions as true, it is clear that
individuals using the roads beginning in the
late 1950s until the late 1980s or early
1990s used the roads without interruption,
they used the roads freely, and though not
constantly, they used the roads continuously
as they needed. Therefore, [the] Court finds
that prior to the interrupting mechanisms
being put in place the roads in question were
subject to continuous use . . . .

The trial court also found that the majority of those using the
roads were nonpermissive users and members of the general public.
Thus, the court determined that w [p]rior to the locking of the
gates in the early 1990s the roads were used as public
thoroughfares." And the court found nthat the continuous use as
a public thoroughfare continued for at least ten years, if not
much longer, or for multiple periods of ten years." The court
therefore concluded that Wasatch County had established by clear
and convincing evidence that the Four Roads had been abandoned
and dedicated to the public. The court decided, however, that
Wasatch County was equitably estopped from opening the roads to
public use because the Okelberrys had, since 1989, asserted
private control over the roads. The court stated that u[t]o
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allow the County now to assert an ownership interest in these
roads would cause the Okelberrys injury [and] would be unjust."
^7
Wasatch County appealed the trial court's equitable
estoppel determination, and the Okelberrys cross-appealed the
court's decision that the Four Roads had been dedicated to the
public. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's
equitable estoppel decision and upheld its decisions regarding
the public dedication of the Four Roads. 7 We granted certiorari
to determine whether the court of appeals applied the correct
standard for determining whether a road has been continuously
used as a public thoroughfare pursuant to Utah Code section 72-5104. The parties do not challenge, and we do not address, the
equitable estoppel issue.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
H8
"On certiorari, we review for correctness the decision
of the court of appeals, not the decision of the district
court."3 "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision
turns on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's
decision under the appropriate standard of review."9 An
appellate court reviews a trial court's legal interpretation of
the Dedication Statute for correctness and its factual findings
for clear error.10 But whether the facts of a case satisfy the
requirements of the Dedication Statute is a mixed question of
fact and law that involves various and complex facts, evidentiary
resolutions, and credibility determinations.11 Thus, an
appellate court reviews u a trial court's decision regarding
whether a public highway has been established under [the
Dedication Statute] . . . for correctness but grant [s] the court

7

See Wasatch County v. Okelberrv, 2006 UT App 473, U 33,
153 P.3d 745.
3

D.J. Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C., 2 006 UT
62, 1 10, 147 P.3d 414.
9

State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 7, 95 P.3d 276.

13

£ee State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, % 20, 144 P.3d 1096.

11

Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309-10

(Utah

1997) .
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significant discretion in its application of the facts to the
statute."12
ANALYSIS
%9
Both the United States and Utah Constitutions prohibit
uncompensated takings of private property.13 Yet, under certain
circumstances, Utah statutory law allows property to be
transferred from private to public use without compensation. The
Dedication Statute at issue in this case allows for such a
transfer. The statute provides that n[a] highway is dedicated
and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten
years."14 In light of the constitutional protection accorded
private property, we have held that a party seeking to establish
dedication and abandonment under this statute bears the burden of
doing so by clear and convincing evidence.15
flO In a number of our past cases, we have sought to
interpret the phrase "continuously used as a public
thoroughfare." We have explained that such use occurs when "the
public, even though not consisting of a great many persons,
[makes] a continuous and uninterrupted use" of a road "as often
as they [find] it convenient or necessary."16 The court of
appeals, borrowing language from one of our cases dealing with
the doctrine of right-of-way by prescription, has added to this
definition as follows: "x [U]se may be continuous though not
constant[] . . . provided it occurred as often as the claimant
had occasion or chose to pass. [. . .] Mere intermission is not
interruption. ' "17

12

Id. at 310.

13

U.S. Const, amend. V (u [N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."); Utah Const,
art. I, § 22 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.").
14

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001) .

15

See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097,
1099 (Utah 1995); Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah
1966) .
15

Bover v. Clark, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1958).

17

Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct.
(continued...)
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fll Despite the best efforts of this court and the court of
appeals, a workable interpretation of "continuous use'' in the
context of the Dedication Statute has remained elusive. We have
described ourselves as "hard-pressed to establish a coherent and
consistent statement of the law on a fact-intensive, case-by-case
review of trial court rulings."13 In reviewing the case now
before us, the court of appeals thoughtfully sought to bring some
coherency and consistency to this area of the law by articulating
a balancing test:
In deciding whether a locked gate acted as an
interruptive force sufficient to restart the
running of the statutory ten-year period, the
trial court should weigh the evidence
regarding the duration and frequency that the
gate was locked against the frequency and
volume of public use to determine if there is
clear and convincing evidence that public use
of the road was continuous.19

17

(. . .continued)
App. 1998) (quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948,
949 (Utah 1977)) . The entire passage from which this quote was
extracted reads as follows:
"A way may be established by
prescription without direct evidence of its
actual use during each year. A use may be
continuous though not constant. A right of
way means a right to pass over another's
land, more or less frequently, according to
the nature of the use to be made by the
easement; and how frequently is immaterial,
provided it occurred as often as the claimant
had occasion or chose to pass. It must
appear not to have been interrupted by the
owner of the land across which the right is
exercised, nor voluntarily abandoned by the
claimant. Mere intermission is not
interruption."
Richards, 559 P.2d at 949 (quoting 1 Thompson on Real Property §
464 (1924) ) .
13

Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 310 (Utah

1997) .
19

Wasatch County v. Qkelberry, 2006 UT App 473, <| 18, 153
P.3d 745. The balancing test articulated by the court of appeals
(continued...)
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Ul2 We find the court of appeals' approach problematic.
The proposed test could be read to suggest that the elements of
the Dedication Statute are met where the duration and frequency
of continuous use as a public thoroughfare simply outweigh the
duration and frequency of interruption during a ten-year period.
Under this standard, it could be argued that even where there is
a significant interruption in the use of a road, if the period of
use is greater than the length of the interruption, the
requirements of the Dedication Statute would be satisfied. We
think it unlikely that this is what the Legislature intended when
it required that a road be "continuously used." Indeed, to
balance interruptions in use against frequency of use in order to
determine whether a road was continuously used is inconsistent
with the very notion of continuous use--any sufficient
interruption in use necessarily makes use noncontinuous.
Moreover, we think that this balancing test fails to remedy the
lack of predictability from which this area of the law suffers.
Thus, while we reject the court of appeals' interpretive
approach, its careful review of our case law and attempt to bring
coherence to that case law highlights for us the need for a
clear, workable standard. We take this opportunity to articulate
such a standard.
fl3 In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the
Legislature's intent.20 We do so by first evaluating "the 'best
evidence' of legislative intent, namely, 'the plain language of
the statute itself.'"21 We give the words of a statute their
"plain, natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, in
the absence of any statutory or well-established technical
meaning, unless it is plain from the statute that a different
meaning is intended."22
1114 The word "continuously" is neither defined in the
Dedication Statute nor imbued with technical meaning. Thus, we
understand "continuously" to have its plain meaning of "without

19

( . . .continued)
applies only to locked gates, but it could arguably apply to
other types of interruptions, and we consider its potentially
broad application here.
20

See Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, <h 16, 158 P.3d 540.

21

Id. (quoting State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, 1 8, 52 P.3d

1276) .
22

State v. Navaro, 26 P.2d 955, 956 (Utah 1933).

No. 20070011

8

interruption."23 A party claiming dedication must therefore
establish by clear and convincing evidence that a road has been
used without interruption as a public thoroughfare for ten years
in order for the road to become dedicated to public use.
H15 The lack of clarity in this area of the law stems
largely from the fact that we have never set forth a standard for
determining what qualifies as a sufficient interruption to
restart the running of the required ten-year period under the
Dedication Statute. We do so now by setting forth a bright-line
rule by which we intend to make application of the Dedication
Statute more predictable:
An overt act that is intended by a property
owner to interrupt the use of a road as a
public thoroughfare, and is reasonably
calculated to do so, constitutes an
interruption sufficient to restart the
running of the required ten-year period under
the Dedication Statute.
This rule does not change the burden of the party claiming
dedication. For a highway to be deemed dedicated to the public,
the party claiming dedication must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the road at issue was continuously used
as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years; credible
evidence of the type of interruption defined above--an overt act
intended to and reasonably calculated to interrupt use of a road
as a public thoroughfare--simply precludes a finding of
continuous use.
fl6 In order to elucidate this standard, we think it
helpful to distinguish between an interruption in use and an
intermission in use. The distinction lies in the intent and
conduct of the property owner. As noted above, a road may be
used continuously even if it is not used constantly or
frequently.24 For example, a road may be used by only one person
once a month, but if this use is as frequent as the public finds

23

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines
"continuous" as umarked by uninterrupted extension in space,
time, or sequence." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 2 70
(11th ed. 2003) .
24

See Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998).
9
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it "convenient or necessary,"25 and the landowner has taken no
action intended and reasonably calculated to interrupt use, the
use is continuous. The one-month period of time between usages
is a mere intermission, not an interruption. Likewise, a road
may be heavily traveled by the public during certain times of the
year but impassable because of weather-related conditions at
other times. Though the use is not constant, if it occurs as
often as the public finds it convenient or necessary, and the
landowner has taken no action intended and reasonably calculated
to interrupt use, the use is continuous. The period of
impassability due to weather is a mere intermission, not an
interruption.
Kl7 Continuous use may be established as to heavily or
lightly used roads, as long as the use is as frequent as the
public finds it convenient or necessary. We emphasize here,
however, that the action necessary by the landowner to establish
an interruption in public use does not vary depending on the
level of public use. An overt act intended and reasonably
calculated to interrupt public use restarts the statutory period,
and the effectiveness of such act is not tied to the level of
public use. In other words, an act by a landowner sufficient to
interrupt public use of a road used on a daily basis by the
public is also sufficient to interrupt public use of a road used
on a monthly basis by the public.
Hl8 We now apply our newly articulated test to the facts of
the case at hand. The Okelberrys asserted at trial that there
were signs on the roads indicating "No Trespassing," uKeep Out,"
or "Private," and that trespassers were at times asked to leave.
Wasatch County conceded that such signs were posted, but argued
that they referred only to property adjoining the roads and not
the roads themselves. While the trial court assumed the
Okelberrys' assertions to be true for purposes of its analysis,
it made no actual findings as to when the signs were posted, what
they appeared to reference, or whether trespassers were asked to
leave. Thus, while it is clear that the posting of the signs
constituted an overt act, it remains a factual question whether
the Okelberrys intended the signs to interrupt public use of the
roads and whether the posting of the signs was reasonably
calculated to do so. Questions also remain as to when the signs
were posted and whether trespassers were asked to leave, and if
so, when and how many.
Kl9 The Okelberrys also claimed at trial that the gates
were periodically locked for several days at a time beginning in

5

Bover v. Clark, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1958).
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the late 1950s. Here again, while the trial court assumed this
claim to be true for purposes of its analysis, it did not make a
factual finding on this issue. The locking of gates for several
days at a time constitutes an overt act intended to interrupt
public use and reasonably calculated to do so. But factual
questions remain as to whether and when such an event or events
occurred. We therefore remand this case for the trial court to
make these factual determinations.
CONCLUSION
120 Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) provides that w [a]
highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when
it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a
period of ten years." We hold today that an overt act that is
intended by the property owner to interrupt the use of a road as
a public thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated to do so, is
an interruption in continuous use sufficient to restart the
running of the ten-year period under this statute. If a party
produces credible evidence of such an interruption, this evidence
will preclude a finding of continuous use. Because the trial
court did not make specific findings of fact regarding the
Okelberrys' evidence of interruption in the use of the Four Roads
as public thoroughfares, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

H21 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant's
opinion.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^
WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of
the State of Utah,
i
Plaintiff,

RULING

v.
E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,
UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND
ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,

Case No. 010500388
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendants.

This matter was last heard by the Court during a trial on July 28, 29, and 30, 2004, where the
parties were directed to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court has
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being
fully advised in the premises issues the following ruling.

FACTUAL SUMMARY
1.

The Plaintiff Wasatch County (hereinafter "County') is a political subdivision of the

State of Utah.
2.

The Defendants E. Ray Okelberry, Brian Okelberry, and Eric Okelberry (hereinafter

"Okelberrys") are the owners of real property located east and north of the town of Wallsburg in
Wasatch County, Utah.

3.

Several roads or portions of roads cross through portions of this property. These roads

have been designated as Maple Canyon Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road,
Parker Canyon Road, and Ridge Line Road.
7.

All of these roads are mountain roads and, except for keeping the roadway clear, have had

little maintenance, if any. Specifically, the County has never maintained the roads. These roads
are typically accessed by pickup truck, snowmobiles, and all-terrain vehicles.
15.

The property in question where the roads are located is generally not accessible until mid-

May or later and is generally not accessible after November 15th.
4.

All of these roads begin and end at points outside of the defendants' property or connect

with other roads which begin and end at points outside of the Okelberry and West Daniels Land
Association property.
5.

West Daniels' Land Association is a record owner of certain parcels of real property

located in Wasatch County over which the Ridge Line Road and the Parker Canyon road
traverse. West Daniels Land Association property adjoins the Okelberry property. West
Daniel's Land Association initially appeared through counsel who later withdrew.
No successor counsel was appointed. West Daniel's Land Association failed to respond to
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and its default was entered. Evidence regarding the use
of those portions of the roads at issue which are located in West Daniel's Land Association
property was submitted at trial.
6.

Circle Springs Road, Parker Canyon Road, and the portion of the Ridge Line Road from

where it enters the Okelberry property on the southeast to where it connects with Parker Canyon
Road are designated as Forest Service Roads on the map currently sold to the public by the Forest
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Service. Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon Road cross thorough
into forest land some distance before they end.
8.

Utah Division of Wildlife Resources is a record owner of a certain parcel of real property

located in Wasatch County in Township 5 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Pursuant to a stipulation entered into between the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources and the
property owners, certain portions of a road known as Ridge Line Road and Fish and Game Road
were abandoned and dedicated to the use of the public subject to certain restrictions. As of the
date of trial on June 28, 29 and 30, 2004, gates along said road were still locked and access was
obstructed by barricades that had been placed there by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources.
9.

There are signs on the property of the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources stating that no

motorized vehicles are allowed on the property. The evidence is such that in certain areas, it is
extremely steep and rocky and only accessible by a 4-wheel-drive vehicle. Portions of the Ridge
Line Road over property owned by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources were built after
1957. The road, at best, cen be described as narrow, rocky and very difficult to traverse.
10.

At the time of the purchase of the property by the Okeiberry's in 1957, the property was

bordered on the east and the south by fences separating the Okelberry property and the United
States Forest public property. There were also multiple gates along the roads: two gates
controlled access from the "Big Glade*' area, one gate controlled access to the Circle Springs
Road, and one gate controlled access to the Ridge Line Road, the gates were wire gates; whoever
went through the gates had to open them and close them behind them.
11.

At trial the Court specifically found that there was no public use of the various roads in

the 1940s or before and also that no evidence of vehicular use prior to the 1950s existed.
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12.

At trial the County presented testimony of various individuals who allegedly used the

roads for many more than ten years for recreational purposes. These individuals testified that
even though there were no-trespassing markers they were able to freely use the roads. They also
stated they were members of the general public without any private right to use the roads.
13.

Plaintiff presented evidence that there were gates located on the roads, but they were

not locked until the early 1990's. Prior to the gates being locked, the existence of the gates did
not interrupt the public's use of the roads.
14.

Plaintiff concedes that occasionally between the late 1950's and late 1980's the

Okelberry's or their agents informed members of the general public who had left the subject
roadways and were using the surrounding Okelberry property that they were trespassing,
however, not until the 1990's did they impede traffic on the road themselves.
17.

At trial the Okeiberrys presented testimony of individuals that Ridge Line Road and

Parker Canyon Road were never at any time open to public use.
18.

The Okeiberrys testified that there were large numbers of people in the community who

asked for permission to use the roads or their property, thus indicating that the roads were not
generally recognized as public.
19.

At trial the Okeiberrys presented testimony of various individuals, including employees

who testified that there was not continuous use of the roads and that if they saw someone using
the roads, they asked them to leave.
16.

At trial the Okeiberrys testified that improvements made to the roads were for the sole

purpose of facilitating their sheep and cattle operation, that the gates were generally closed from
the beginning of their ownership to control their sheep and cattle and to restrict travel on the
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roads.
20.

In the early 1990's the Okelberry's started selling trespass permits to persons wanting to

use the Okeiberry property for wood gathering, camping, or hunting.
21.

In the mid 1990's the Okelberry's allowed their land to be placed into a Cooperative

Wildlife Management Unit "CWMIT (a.k.a. a Private Hunting Unit "PHU"). Said property is
currently still part of a CWMU.
RULING
As provided by statute, a private road must meet a three part test to become dedicated and
abandoned to a public highway. The three requirements are (1) continuous use, (2) as a public
thoroughfare, (3) for a period often years. Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-104(1) (2003). The three
elements must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence" by the party claiming the road has
been abandoned to public use. Thomas v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639 (1972). Once established, a
public road continues to be a public road until it is "abandoned or vacated by order of the
highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent authority.'" Utah Code Ann. 72-5105(1) (2004).
First, the road must have been subject to "continuous use." Utah Courts have interpreted
"continuous use" in various instances to mean the public has used the roads "extensively,"
Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981), "frequently and freely,"
Thurman v Bryam, 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981). However, continuous does not mean constant.
The supreme court has stated that "use may be continuous though not constant... provided it
occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is not
interruption." Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Ut. Ct. App 1998) (quoting
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Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). Similarly, in Boyer v Clark, 326 P.2d
107, 108 (Utah 1958), the supreme court found as a matter of law that a public highway existed
even though "the use of the road was not great because comparatively few people had need to
travel over it, but those of the public who had such need, did so."
The Okelberrys have argued that use was not constant because at the time of purchase in
1957 there were gates in place, concededly though, they were not always locked and did not
prevent travel. The Okelberrys claim that beginning in the 1960s the gates were periodically
locked for several days at a time and that signs were also posted on the gates and property which
stated "No Trespassing-Private Property." Thus, they argue that any interruption of public access
during the relevant periods is enough to prevent use from being continuous. Plaintiffs deny the
Defendant's factual assertions claiming that while there were gates on the roads, they were not
locked until the 1990's and that once signs were posted, they seemed to refer only to the property
abutting the roads and not the roads themselves.
This Court finds the facts of the present case similar to the facts of Boyer v. Clark
wherein at issue was Middle Canyon Road that had been used for wagon and horse traffic. As
previously stated, the Boyer court noted that the public, "though not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use of middle canyon road . . . as often as they
found it convenient or necessary." Taking even the Defendant's factual assertions as true, it is
clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950fs until the late 1980's or early
1990fs used the roads without interruption, they used the roads freely, and though not constantly,
they used the roads continuously as they needed. Therefore, that Court finds that prior to the
interrupting mechanisms being put in place the roads in question were subject to continuous use
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and Plaintiffs met their burden proving the first element of the statute.
Second, the continuous use must have been as a "public thoroughfare." The Supreme
Court of Utah has stated that a place becomes a public thoroughfare when the public has a
"general right of passage." Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997). It is sufficient to
show that the road was used freely by the general public. Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447,449
(Utah 1981). The general public, however, does not include adjoining land owners or
individuals with permission of adjoining land owners. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888
P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). "Use under a private right is not sufficient" to establish a public
right. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d at 311. Also, as once was the case, it is no longer
necessary to prove the land owner's intent or consent to offer the road to the public. See
Thurman v. Byramy 626 P.2d at 449.
In making the public thoroughfare determination, trial courts are "permitted some reign to
grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a public thoroughfare." Kohler v.
Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). The defendants claim they gave permission to
individuals to use the roads and unauthorized individuals were removed. Plaintiffs claim that
while some individuals who have used the roads were permissive users, the majority were using
the roads without permission from the land owners. None of the individuals who testified on
behalf of the Plaintiff own property adjacent to or along the roads. The Court finds that the
individuals who have used the roads have been members of the general public who used the
roads as a thoroughfare to public lands and/or for recreation. Prior to the locking of the gates in
the early 1990's the roads were used as public thoroughfares.
Third, and lastly, the continuous use as a public thoroughfare must have lasted for a
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period often years. From the facts that have been presented, it is clear to the Court that the
continuous use as a public thoroughfare continued for at least ten years, if not much longer, or for
multiple periods often years. Starting in 1960 until the early 1990's when the Okelberry's began
locking the gates and selling hunting permits the roads were accessible and used by the general
public as they found necessary and convenient. It is clear that the third statutory element has
been easily met.
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Plaintiff has not met their
burden in regards to Maple Canyon Road. The Court finds that there was evidence that Maple
Canyon Road had been locked at the Wallsburg end prior to the locking of the other roads, and
that it has a history of washing out and therefore, there was no evidence of continuous use for ten
years. The Court also finds that the Plaintiff has in fact met their burden as to Ridge Line Road,
Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon Road, that they were used
continuously by the public as a public thoroughfare for a period of well over ten years prior to
1989 when the Okelberry's began locking the gates. Finding that there were abandoned to public
roads, the Court finds the width of the roads to be two-track, approximately ten feet in width.
The Court also finds that the public has been effectively cut off from use of these public roads
since 1989.
After finding the roads to be public roads, the Court now turns to the issue of whether
they continue as public roads after a twelve year period of nonuse and private control exerted by
the defendants over the roads.
The court finds that while public roads once dedicated can be abandoned or vacated only
"by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent authority." Ut.
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Code Ann. 72-5-015 (2004). Prior to 1911 a public road could be vacated after afive-yearperiod
of nonuse. The statute has since been amended by deleting that provision. The Court held that
the legislature clearly intended to limit the method of vacating public roads to the specific
statutory requirements and no longer allow forfeiture through nonuse. Henderson v. Osguthorpe,
657 P.2d 1268, 1270-1271 (Utah 1982). However, this Court finds the principle of estoppel is
dispositive in the present case.
In Premium Oil v. Cedar City 187 P.2d 199 (Utah 1947), the supreme court held that a
strip of land once dedicated as a public road had been used in a manner directly in conflict with
the land's dedication as a public road. The court stated that "the manner in which the city used
the strip was openly hostile to the public use as a street and should have been notice to all that
any dedication, if previously intended, has been abandoned. Under the facts of the case, the court
held that the Plaintiff would be estopped to claim an improper abandonment or vacation, this
Court finds that while the roads at issue were properly abandoned to public use by compliance
with the statutory requirements, the Defendants for a period of twelve years exerted control and
used the roads in an openly hostile mariner to the public use of the streets. Applied to the present
case, the County having failed to bring an action for twelve years must now be estopped from
doing so.
As further stated in Premium Oil, "in many cases where cities attempt to open dedicated
street for the benefit of the public, the courts have estopped the city from enforcing a dedication
because the city authorities and the public itself has taken no action over a period of years, to
prevent the erection of valuable improvements." 187 P.2d at 204. Allowing the County to open
the roads as public roads now would ruin the Okelberry sheep and cattle operation as well as
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eliminate the hunting unit now being operated by Shane Ford. Admittedly little improvements
have been made to the roads themselves, but doubtless large amounts of time and money has
been expended on behalf of these business operations and the Defendants have relied on their
private use of the road to sustain and build their businesses. It would be inequitable to now,
after twelve years of clearly private use of the roads, to allow the County to open the roads to the
Defendants' detriment.
CONCLUSION
By clear and convincing evidence the Court finds that the roads in question were
abandoned to public roads, but the County is now estopped from opening them to public use
because of their failure to bring an action against the Okelberrys who asserted private control
over the roads for twelve years in opposition to their public status. The Court directs counsel for
the Defendants to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final order consistent with this
ruling, and directs counsel to submit the order to opposing counsel ro review and to the Court for
final approval.

DATED this '/j7 day of August, 2004.
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Our File No.

Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of
the State of Utah,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
Case No. 010500388
Judge Donald J. Eyre

vs.
E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,
UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND
ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants.

This matter came on for trial on July 28, 29 and 30, 2004. The Court heard the
testimony of various witnesses and received various exhibits. Counsel was directed to prepare
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court has now reviewed the file,
considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments and now, being fully advised
in the premises, makes and enters the following:
FINDLNGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff Wasatch County (hereinafter "County") is a political subdivision

of the State of Utah.

2.

The Defendants E. Ray Okelberry, Brian Okelberry, and Eric Okelberry

(hereinafter "Okelberrys") are the owners of real property located east and north of the town of
Walisburg in Wasatch County, Utah.
3.

Several roads or portions of roads cross through portions of this property. These

roads have been designated as Maple Canyon Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road,
Parker Canyon Road, and Ridge Line Road.
4.

All of these roads are mountain roads and, except for keeping the roadway clear,

have had little maintenance, if any. Specifically, the County has never maintained the roads. These
roads are typically accessed by pickup truck, snowmobiles, and all-terrain vehicles.
5.

The property in question wrhere the roads are located is generally not accessible

until mid-May or later and is generally not accessible after November 15 xh
6.

All of these roads begin and end at points outside of the defendants' property

or connect with other roads which begin and end at points outside of the Okelberry and West
Daniels Land Association property.
7.

West Daniels' Land Association is a record owner of certain parcels of real

property located in Wasatch County over which the Ridge Line Road and the Parker Canyon road
traverse. West Daniels Land Association property adjoins the Okelberry property. West Daniel's
Land Association initially appeared through counsel who later withdrew. No successor counsel
was appointed. West Daniel's Land Association failed to respond to Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment and its default was entered. Evidence regarding the use of those portions of
the roads at issue which are located in West Daniel's Land Association property was submitted
at trial.
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6.

Circle Springs Road, Parker Canyon Road, and the portion of the Ridge Line

Road from where it enters the Okelberry property on the southeast to where it connects with
Parker Canyon Road are designated as Forest Service Roads on the map currently sold to the
public by the Forest Service. Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon
Road cross thorough into forest land some distance before they end.
7.

Utah Division of Wildlife Resources is a record owner of a certain parcel of real

property located in Wasatch County in Township 5 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian. Pursuant to a stipulation entered into between the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
and the property owners, certain portions of a road known as Ridge Line Road and Fish and Game
Road were abandoned and dedicated to the use of the public subject to certain restrictions. As of
the date of trial on June 28, 29 and 30, 2004, gates along said road were still locked and access
was obstructed by barricades that had been placed there by the Utah Division of Wildlife
Resources.
8.

,
There are signs on the property of the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources

stating that no motorized vehicles are allowed on the property. The evidence is such that in certain
areas, it is extremely steep and rocky and only accessible by a 4-wheel-drive vehicle. Portions of
the Ridge Line Road over property owned by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources were built
after 1957. The road, at best, can be described as narrow, rocky and very difficult to traverse.
9.

At the time of the purchase of the property by the Okelberry's in 1957, the

property was bordered on the east and the south by fences separating the Okelberry property and
the United States Forest public property. There were also multiple gates along the roads: two
gates controlled access from the "Big Glade" area, one gate controlled access to the Circle Springs

3

Road, and one gate controlled access to the Ridge Line Road, the gates were wire gates; whoever
went through the gates had to open them and close them behind them.
10.

At trial the Court specifically found that there was no public use of the various

roads in the 1940s or before and also that no evidence of vehicular use prior to the 1950s existed.
11.

At trial the County presented testimony of various individuals who allegedly used

the roads for many more than ten years for recreational purposes. These individuals testified that
even though there were no-trespassing markers they were able to freely use the roads. They also
stated they were members of the general public without any private right to use the roads.
12.

Plaintiff presented evidence that there were gates located on the roads, but they

were not locked until the early 1990's. Prior to the gates being locked, the existence of the gates
did not interrupt the public's use of the roads.
13.

Plaintiff concedes that occasionally between the late 1950's and late 1980's the

Okelberry's or their agents informed members of the general public who had left the subject
roadways and were using the surrounding Okelberry property that they were trespassing,
however, not until the 1990's did they impede traffic on the road themselves.
14.

At trial the Okelberrys presented testimony of individuals that Ridge Line Road

and Parker Canyon Road were never at any time open to public use.
15.

The Okelberrys testified that there were large numbers of people in the

community who asked for permission to use the roads or their property, thus indicating that the
roads were not generally recognized as public.
16.

At trial the Okelberrys presented testimony of various individuals, including

employees who testified that there was not continuous use of the roads and that if they saw
someone using the roads, they asked them to leave.
4

ifi

17.

At trial the Okeiberrys testified that improvements made to the roads were for

the sole purpose of facilitating their sheep and cattle operation, that the gates were generally
closed from the beginning of their ownership to control their sheep and cattle and to restrict travel
on the roads.
18.

In the early 1990s the Okeiberrys started selling trespass permits to persons

wanting to use the Okelberry property for wood gathering, camping, or hunting.
19.

In the mid 1990s the Okeiberrys allowed their land to be placed into a

Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit "CWMU" (a.k.a. a Private Hunting Unit "PHU"). Said
property is currently st\U part of a CWMU.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

As provided by statute, a private road must meet a three part test to become

dedicated and abandoned to a public highway. The three requirements are (1) continuous use, (2)
as a public thoroughfare, (3) for a period often years. Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-104(1) (2003). The
three elements must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence" by the party claiming the road
has been abandoned to public use. Thomas v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639 (1972). Once established,
a public road continues to be a public road until it is "abandoned or vacated by order of the
highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent authority." Utah Code Ann.
72-5-105(1) (2004).
2.

First, the road must have been subject to "continuous use." Utah Courts have

interpreted "continuous use" in various instances to mean the public has used the roads
"extensively," Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981), "frequently and
freely," Thurman v. Bryam. 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981). However, continuous does not mean
5

41

constant. The supreme court has stated that "use may be continuous though not constant ...
provided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is
not interruption." Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). Similarly, in Bover v. Clark,
326 P.2d 107, 108 (Utah 1958), the supreme court found as a matter of law that a public highway
existed even though "the use of the road was not great because comparatively few people had need
to travel over it, but those of the public who had such need, did so."
3.

The Okelberrys have argued that use was not constant because at the time of

purchase in 1957 there were gates in place, concededly though, they were not always locked and
did not prevent travel. The Okelberrys claim that beginning in the 1960s the gates were
periodically locked for several days at a time and that signs were also posted on the gates and
property which stated "No Trespassing-Private Property.M Thus, they argue that any interruption
of public access during the relevant periods is enough to prevent use from being continuous.
Plaintiffs deny the Defendant's factual assertions claiming that while there were gates on the
roads, they were not locked until the 1990s and that once signs were posted, they seemed to refer
only to the property abutting the roads and not the roads themselves.
4.

This Court finds the facts of the present case similar to the facts of Boyer v.

Clark wherein at issue was Middle Canyon Road that had been used for wagon and horse traffic.
As previously stated, the Boyer court noted that the public, "though not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use of middle canyon road . . . as often as they
found it convenient or necessary." Taking even the Defendants' factual assertions as true, it is
clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early
1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the roads freely, and though not constantly,
6

they used the roads continuously as they needed. Therefore, that Court finds that prior to the
interrupting mechanisms being put in place the roads in question were subject to continuous use
and Plaintiffs met their burden proving the first element of the statute.
5.

Second, the continuous use must have been as a "public thoroughfare." The

Supreme Court of Utah has stated that a place becomes a public thoroughfare when the public has
a "general right of passage." Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997). It is sufficient
to show that the road was used freely by the general public. Thurman v. Byram. 626 P.2d 447,
449 (Utah 1981). The general public, however, does not include adjoining land owners or
individuals with permission of adjoining land owners. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888
P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). "Use under a private right is not sufficient" to establish a public
right. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d at 311. Also, as once was the case, it is no longer
necessary to prove the land owner's intent or consent to offer the road to the public. See Thurman
v. Bvram. 626 P.2d at 449.
6.

In making the public thoroughfare determination, trial courts are "permitted some

reign to grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a public thoroughfare."
Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). The defendants claim they gave
permission to individuals to use the roads and unauthorized individuals were removed. Plaintiffs
claim that while some individuals who have used the roads were permissive users, the majority
were using the roads without permission from the land owners. None of the individuals who
testified on behalf of the Plaintiff own property adjacent to or along the roads. The Court finds
that the individuals who have used the roads have been members of the general public who used
the roads as a thoroughfare to public lands and/or for recreation. Prior to the locking of the gates
in the early 1990s the roads were used as public thoroughfares.
7

7.

Third, and lastly, the continuous use as a public thoroughfare must have lasted

for a period of ten years. From the facts that have been presented, it is clear to the Court that the
continuous use as a public thoroughfare continued for at least ten years, if not much longer, or
for multiple periods of ten years. Starting in 1960 until the early 1990s when the Okelberrys
began locking the gates and selling hunting permits the roads were accessible and used by the
general public as they found necessary and convenient. It is clear that the third statutory element
has been easily 'met.
8.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Plaintiff has not met

their burden in regards to Maple Canyon Road. The Court finds that there was evidence that
Maple Canyon Road had been locked at the Wallsburg end prior to the locking of the other roads,
and that it has a history of washing out and therefore, there was no evidence of continuous use
for ten years. The Court also finds that the Plaintiff has in fact met their burden as to Ridge Line
Road, Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow Road, and Parker Canyon Road, that they were used
continuously by the public as a public thoroughfare for a period of well over ten years prior to
1989 when the Okelberrys began locking the gates. Finding that there were abandoned to public
roads, the Court finds the width of the roads to be two-track, approximately ten feet in width. The
Court also finds that the public has been effectively cut off from use of these public roads since
1989.
9.

After finding the roads to be public roads, the Court now turns to the issue of

whether they continue as public roads after a twelve year period of nonuse and private control
exerted by the defendants over the roads.
10.

The Court finds that while public roads once dedicated can be abandoned or

vacated only "by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent
8

Ihl ( ode Ann 72 t? 015 (2i,H)4> Prior to 1911 , a public road could be vacated after

authoril\

a five-year period of nonuse. The statute has since been amended by deleting that provision Hie
Court helc that the legislature clearly intended to liirni ihc meihod of vacating puhlu. road •» ti ihi
•:K*..::.-. ^aturory requirements and no longer allow forfeiture through nonuse. Henderson v.
Qsguthorpe. 657 P 2d 1268 1270-1271 (Utah 1982). However, this Court finds the principle of
estoppel is dispositive in the present case.
11.

i

- . * 1QQ «'T='ah 1947), the supreme court

In Premium Oil v. Cedar City, ^

held that a strip of land once dedicated as a public mad had been used m a manner directly in
conflict with the land's dedication as a public road, i u c c u u u \*: *o '" ^ '\\

-a* ^

tl le city used the sti tp w as openly 1 lostile to the public use as a street and should have been notice
to all that any dedication, if previously intended, has been abandoned. Under the facts of the case,
the court held that the Plaintiff would be estopped to claim an improper abandonment or

.. *r -on.

tliu ( nun find iluii aloft" i In- IUJLK at ISOK1 'Aurr properly abandoned to public use by compliance
with the statutory requirements, the Defendants for a period of twelve years exerted control and
used the roads in an openly hostile manner to the public use of the streets. Applied to the present
ease, the Count) 1 ta ii ig failed to brii lg ai i action, for twelve years i i n ist i low "be estopped from,
doing so.
12.
dedicated

As further stated in Premium Oil, "in many cases where cities attempt to open
-••

....-•

^

^ / p - : *•

^:. • >r. mforcing a

dedication because the city authorities and the public itself has taken no action over a period of
years, to prevent the erection of valuable improvements." 187 P.2d at 204. Allowing the County
to open, the roads as pi lblic roads now would n in i the Okelbet i ; •' sheep ai id :attle operation as well
as eliminate the hunting unit now being operated by Shane Ford. Admittedly little improvements
9

have been made to the roads themselves, but doubtless large amounts of time and money has been
expended on behalf of these business operations and the Defendants have relied on their private
use of the road to sustain and build their businesses. It would be inequitable to now, after twelve
years of clearly private use of the roads, to allow the County to open the roads to the Defendants'
detriment.
13.

By clear and convincing evidence the Court finds that the roads in question were

abandoned to public roads, but the County is now estopped from opening them to public use
because of their failure to bring an action against the Okelberrys who asserted private control over
the roads for twelve years in Opposition Jo tyeir public status.
DATED this

72L day &f Septcnr

*ss;
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APPRnYl:D AS l u lORM:

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFFS U 'I UKNKY
TO:

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for Defendants Okelberry, will

submit the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court for
signature upon the expiration of the time permitted for the filing of a written objection pursuant
in Rule 7(f)(2) of Hie IHali Rule, of (..ivil Procedure.
DATED this

day of September, 2004.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage prepaid, and also transmitted by facsimile to the fax number listed below this [H

day

of September, 2004, to:
Scott H. Sweat
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
114 South 200 West
Heber City, UT 84032
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D O N R. P E T E R S E N (2576), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991
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Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry

II" 1 1 1 IE FOIJ R 1 1 1 Jl IDICIAI DIS I R IC I COI IRT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
'

Case No. 010500388
Judge Donald J. Eyre

vs.
E.RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,
UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND
ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants.
This i natter came on foi trial on July 28, 29 and 30, 2004. The Court heard, the
testimony of various witnesses and received various exhibits. Counsel was directed to prepare
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions ot I ws 1 he ( utiri nwurvaf tin1 tik"
.''*.--= ;:•*'' *; -:

COILMLI

red ilw

-* parties, heard oral arguments, and now having heretofore entered its

Findings of Fact and < 'onclusions or" Law and being fully advised in the premises, makes and
enters the following:

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

As provided by statute, a private road must meet a three part test to become

dedicated and abandoned to a public highway. The three requirements are (1) continuous use, (2)
as a public thoroughfare, (3) for a period of ten years. Ut. Code Ann. 72-5-104(1) (2003). The
three elements must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence" by the party claiming the road
has been abandoned to public use. Thomas v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639 (1972). Once established,
a public road continues to be a public road until it is "abandoned or vacated by order of the
highway authorities having jurisdiction or by other competent authority." Utah Code Ann.
72-5-105(1) (2004).
2.

First, the road must have been subject to "continuous use." Utah Courts have

interpreted "continuous use" in various instances to mean the public has used the roads
"extensively," Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981), "frequently and
freely," Thurman v. Bryam, 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981). However, continuous does not mean
constant. The supreme court has stated that "use may be continuous though not constant ...
provided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is
not interruption." Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). Similarly, inBoyerv. Clark,
326 P.2d 107, 108 (Utah 1958), the supreme court found as a matter of law that a public highway
existed even though "the use of the road was not great because comparatively few people had need
to travel over it, but those of the public who had such need, did so."
3.

The Okelberrys have argued that use was not constant because at the time of

purchase in 1957 there were gates in place, concededly though, they were not always locked and
2
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rvs claim, that beginning in the 1960s the gates were

periodically locked for several days at a time and that signs were also posted on the gates and
property which stated " No Trespassing-Private Property." F!m\ thc\ drgue thai anv mii'iiuptinn
of public access duimg ilie relevant periods is enough to prevent use from, being continuous.
Plaintiffs deny the Defendant's factual assertions claiming that while there were gates on the
roads, they were not locked until the 1990s and that once signs were pi isled they srnneit ih» ivtn
i mill in ijir proper 1 ibuttint? llie mad1- iinl "i<n the roads themselves.
4.

II us Court finds the facts of the present case similar i-

-•• : \ci> of I* *-:\

Clark wherein at issue was Middle Canyon Road that had been used for wagon and ?;; r , r

o*

As previously staled, the Buyer umn noted lh.it I he publ te, "Tiiouifj) not consisting of a great many
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use of middle canyon road . . . as often as they
found it convenient or necessary." Taking even the Defendants' factual assertions as tn le, it is
clear that individuals tniou 'tie i Mils heginmim ,ri <lvj lav M*,,0,l III"<1 ilr lair !l)K(»s o> early
^-

.

mout interruption, they used the roads freely, and though not constantly,

'r*v used i;nc roads continuously as they needed. Therefore, that Court finds that prior to the
interrupting mechanisms being pi it it 1 place the r Dads in questioi i were subject to coi iti nuous use
JIHI

PldHUilN met their burden, proving the first element of the statute.
5.

Second, the continuous use must have been as a "public thoroughfare." The

Supreme Court of Utah has stated that a place becomes a public thoroughfare u lini ihr pul .1 u- has
a "general nghi ot \n;^di\r " Heber City v. Simpson, (H2 P 2d M)l flJtah IW 1 / [i is sufficient
to show that the road was used freely by the general public. Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447,
449 (Utah 1981). The general public, however, does nor mUude adjoining hml nuncio m
'iM'vidml, \» Mh permission oi ad]omlng land owners,, Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888
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P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). "Use under a private right is not sufficient" to establish a public
right. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d at 311. Also, as once was the case, it is no longer
necessary to prove the land owner's intent or consent to offer the road to the public. See Thurman
v. Bvram. 626 P.2d at 449.
6.

In making the public thoroughfare determination, trial courts are "permitted some

reign to grapple with the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a public thoroughfare."
Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). The defendants claim they gave
permission to individuals to use the roads and unauthorized individuals were removed. Plaintiffs
claim that while some individuals who have used the roads were permissive users, the majority
were using the roads without permission from the land owners. None of the individuals who
testified on behalf of the Plaintiff own property adjacent to or alofig the roads. The Court finds
that the individuals who have used the roads have been members of the general public who used
the roads as a thoroughfare to public lands and/or for recreation. Prior to the locking of the gates
in the early 1990s the roads were used as public thoroughfares.
7.

Third, and lastly, the continuous use as a public thoroughfare must have lasted

for a period of ten years. From the facts that, have been presented, it is clear to the Court that the
continuous use as a public thoroughfare continued for at least ten years, if not much longer, or
for multiple periods of ten years. Starting in I960 until the early 1990s when the Okelberrys
began locking the gates and selling hunting permits the roads were accessible and used by the
general public as they found necessary and convenient. It is clear that the third statutory element
has been easily met.
8.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Plaintiff has not met

their burden in regards to Maple Canyon Road. The Court finds that there was evidence that
4

Maple Canyon Road had been KK ked at the Wallsburg end prior to the locking of the other roads,
jnd that it has a history of washing out and therefore, there wu- no evidence nt eomiru

^ use

for ten years. The Court also finds that the Plaintiff has in ' *.
koad

•. . • I In wiiK] I Inline Road, and Parker • i i i . - ^ k - u i that they were used

:-NI--;

continuously by the public as a public thoroughfare for a period of well ><e: . :;i vcars f^rwT u,
1989 when the Okelberrys began locking the gates. Findi-v •:
road*

••. •

!
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• width of the roads to be two-track, approximately ten feet in width. [lie

Court also finds that the public has been effectively cut off from use of these public roads since
1989.
Af'ii'T finding tin1 roads in he puhm mads, thij i ourt now turns to the issue of

9.

whether they continue as public roads after a twelve year period of nonuse and private control
exerted by the defendants over the roads.
The C o u r finds \\\M
..lean

'.

authority ' n

*\\\\\V

puhlu. ro.ids

.MKC

dedicated tan be abandoned or

• >' order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction

--•-

diei competent

Code Ann. 72-5-015 (2004). Prior to 1911, a public road could be vacated after

a five-year period of nonuse. The statu

,J

.

^ - amended Ivy deleting thai provision The

< "nurt held thai the legislature clearly L.c;.^ui *o hunt me method of vacating public roads to the
specific statutory requirements and no longer allow forfeiture through nonuse. Henderson v.
Osguthorpe, 657 P.2d 1268, 1270-1271 (Utah 1982)., H n u . ^ r fins ( mm Mnd« the principle of
eo .*;-*

;>-si.

JI it case.

In Premium Oil v. Cedar Citv, 187 F V 199 (Utah 1947), the supreme court
held that a -rnr of Lnd once dedicated as a public road h i . - eei i i ised in a niai mer directly in
c

fT

i . • ^-::sat:-:n as a public road The court stated that "the manner m which
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the city used the strip was openly hostile to the public use as a street and should have been notice
to all that any dedication, if previously intended, has been abandoned. Under the facts of the case,
the court held that the Plaintiff would be estopped to claim an improper abandonment or vacation,
this Court finds that while the roads at issue were properly abandoned to public use by compliance
with the statutory requirements, the Defendants for a period of twelve years exerted control and
used the roads in an openly hostile manner to the public use of the streets. Applied to the present
case, the County having failed to bring an action for twelve years must now be estopped from
doing so.
12.

As further stated in Premium Oil, "in many cases where cities attempt to open

dedicated street for the benefit of the public, the courts have estopped the city from enforcing a
dedication because the city authorities and the public itself has taken no action over a period of
years, to prevent the erection of valuable improvements." 187 P.2d at 204. Allowing the County
to open the roads as public roads now would ruin the Okelberry sheep and cattle operation as well
as eliminate the hunting unit now being operated by Shane Ford. Admittedly little improvements
have been made to the roads themselves, but doubtless large amounts of time and money has been
expended on behalf of these business operations and the Defendants have relied on their private
use of the road to sustain and build their businesses. It would be inequitable to now, after twelve
years of clearly private use of the roads, to allow the County to open the roads to the Defendants'
detriment.
13.

By clear and convincing evidence the Court finds that the roads in question were

abandoned to public roads, but the County is now estopped from opening them to public

6

use because of their failure to bring an action against the Okelberrys who asserted private control
over the roads for twelve years in opposition to their public status.

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff

7

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY
TO:

SCOTT H. SWEAT, ESQ.
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for Defendants Okelberry, will

submit the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court for
signature upon the expiration of the time permitted for the filing of a written objection pursuant
to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this \^A day of September, 2004.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendants Okelberry
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage prepaid, and also transmitted by facsimile to the fax number listed below this 1 \ day
of September, 2004, to:
Scott H. Sweat
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney
114 South 200 West
Heber City, UT 84032

A f e fam^
G 'DRTOKELBERY ORD
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APPENDIX E
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Ruling on Motion to Amend Judgment,
February 23, 2005, R.489-481

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WASATCH COUNTY, a body public of
the State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF
FACT AND RULING ON MOTION
TO AMEND JUDGMENT

v.
E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY,
UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE
RESOURCES, WEST DANIELS LAND
ASSOCIATION, and JOHN DOES 1-25,

Case No. 010500388
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on December 17, 2004, on Plaintiffs Motion To Alter
Judgment or Amend Findings of Fact. Plaintiff was represented by Scott H. Sweat, Deputy
Wasatch County Attorney. Defendants were represented by Don R. Petersen and Ryan D.
Tenney. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the parties memoranda, heard oral
arguments, and being fully advised on the premises issues the following supplement:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Testimony was presented at trial showing that though the roads at issue in this case are
in many places rough and difficult to traverse, Wasatch County (the County) has not made any
efforts in the past to pave, grade, or otherwise improve the condition of these roads.
2. Testimony was also presented at trial indicating that Wasatch County currently has no
plans to improve these roads in the future.

3. Due to the rough nature of these roads, the Okelberrys and their employees have at
certain times in the past made efforts to improve the conditions of these roads. Specifically, they
have used heavy equipment to grade and level certain sections of the roads and have spent
considerable time and energy removing fallen trees.
4. The Okelberrys and their employees have constructed and maintained gates that are
placed at various points along the contested roads. Due to problems with vandalism, the
Okelberrys have found it necessary to repair and maintain some of these gates. Their repair
efforts have included the use of concrete as a means of permanently securing the fence posts.
5. At various times in the past, the Okelberrys and their employees have locked these
gates. Beginning in the 1990fs, the Okelberrys began locking these gates on a more permanent
basis. Prior to the filing of this suit, Wasatch County had taken no official action to prevent the
Okelberrys from locking these gates.
6. The Okelberrys and their employees have posted "no trespassing" signs at various
places along these roads. Prior to the filing of this suit, Wasatch County had taken no official
action to prevent the Okelberrys from posting such signs.
7. Testimony was presented at trial indicating that the Okelberrys and their employees
have at various times asked persons to leave the property surrounding the roads. Beginning in
the 1990's, the Okelberrys began restricting access to the roads. Prior to the filing of this suit,
Wasatch County had taken no official action to prevent the Okelberrys from restricting the access
to these roads.
S. The Okelberrys and their employees have sold trespass permits to members of the
public, thereby granting those members permission to use the Okelberry property and
surrounding roads. Prior to the filing of this suit, Wasatch County had taken no official action to

prevent the Okelberrys from selling these trespass permits.
9 Beginning in the mid-1990's, the Okelberrys entered into a contractual relationship
that allowed private hunters to access their land in return for a significant monetary payment.
These hunting contracts were administered as part of a Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit
(CWMU).
10. Shayne Ford is currently the operator of the CWMU that has access to the Okelberry
property. At trial, Shayne Ford testified that his CWrMU would no longer use the Okelberry
property if the contested roads were made open to the public.
11. No evidence was provided at trial to suggest the Wasatch County had ever
affirmatively represented to the Okelberrys or anyone that it intended \o abandon the public roads
at issue or to otherwise not enforce the public's right to access these roads.
RULING
Under Utah law, in order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a party must meet
three elements: (1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a
claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the
first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that
would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission,
act, or failure to act. The View Condo. Owners Assn. v. MSICO, L.L.C., 2004 UT App 104, 33,
90 P.3d 1042 (quoting Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(emphasis added)).
First, the Court finds that for at least ten years the County failed to act as if the roads were
public and that failure to act is inconsistent with their present assertion that those roads are
public. Though the County is claiming to have had an ownership interest in the roads, they failed

to act in any way as owners until the filing of this action. Specifically, the Okelberrys placed
gates across these roads, locked those gates for periods of time, asked persons to leave,
completely controlled access to the roads since 1989, and have even sold trespass permits to
persons wishing to use these roads. Each of these activities are clearly hostile to any claim of
ownership by any other entity. If a private citizen constructed a toll booth across a residential
road, for example, it would clearly be expected that the municipality would take immediate steps
to reassert control. Here, the Okelberrys have controlled access to these roads for over a decade
and have in fact actually received money from persons who wished to gain access.
In further support, the Okelberrys have expended some effort in the past to maintain and
improve these roads, while the County has not expended any efforts in this regard. See Premium
Oil v. Cedar City, 187 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah 1947) (holding that it was "important" that "[n]o
attempt was made by the city or the public to improve the property so as to indicate the presence
of a street"); Wall v. Salt Lake City, 168 P. 766, 768 (Utah 1917) (noting that the private
landowner had made certain "improvements" by "leveling and filling in low places" in partial
reliance on the municipality's own inaction). No witness at trial even suggested that the County
had undertaken any specific action during the time periods to assert the public1 rights to those
roads (such as forcibly removing gates or locks, or by taking any efforts at all to maintain or
improve those roads), nor was there any suggestion that any previous action had been filed in any
court to obtain a declaration that the roads were in fact public. Thus, the Court finds the first
prong of the estoppel analysis has been met.
Second, the Court finds that the Okelberry's have taken reasonable actions based on the
County's failure to assert any ownership interest in these roads. Specifically, the Okelberrys
have constructed and maintained gates across the roads, have spent time and energy improving

and maintaining the roads (rather than calling on county personnel to do so), and have developed
and maintained a livestock operation that incorporates and uses all of the roads in question
(rather than purchasing and moving their livestock operations). Also, the Okelberrys have
entered into a business relationship with the CWMU that is operated by Shayne Ford. This
business relationship has continued for almost a decade, and is by Shayne Ford's testimony,
expressly predicated on the Okelberrys' continued control over these roads. The Court concludes
that the Okelberrys would not have undertaken these activities had the County asserted any
ownership rights over these roads, thus satisfying the second prong of the estoppel analysis.
Third, the Court finds that the Okelberrys would suffer injury if the County were now
allowed to assert ownership rights over these roads. The most significant injury would be the
loss of income due to the expected departure of the CWMU. The Okelberrys also testified at trial
that they would suffer certain injuries to their own ongoing livestock operation if these roads
were opened to the public. Opening the roads to the public would in effect destroy the
Okelberrys' sheep and cattle operation. These losses clearly satisfy the third estoppel factor.
The Plaintiff, County, asserts that estoppel may not be found against a government entity.
The Supreme Court of Utah did state that the "general rule is that estoppel may not be asserted
against a governmental entity." Weese v. Davis County Comm Vz, 834 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1992)
(emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court of Utah has applied the principle of estoppel in
pais "to exceptional cases where the elements calling for its exercise appear to have been an
abandonment to the public use for the prescriptive period, inclosure and expensive
improvements, such as large and costly buildings, acts of the municipality inducing the abutter to
believe that there is no longer any street, and the expenditure of money in reliance upon the acts
of the municipality." The Court further stated that "the absolute bona fides of the abutter or

adverse possessor is a most important factor where is estoppel in pais is claimed. The acts relied
on must be of such character as to amount to a fraud, if the city were permitted to claim
otherwise.'* Wall 168 P. at 772. This Court finds the present case to be exceptional so as to
invoke the exception.
The Court finds it significant that the roads in question are located on private property
and the roads themselves were private property prior to their abandonment to public use by their
constant use. Prior to the filing of this action, the County has never asserted any type of
ownership control over the roads. The County has never made any improvements on the roads.
The County has itself treated the roads as the Okelberrys' private property by collecting property
taxes on the land. The Walls court stated that the property in dispute in that case had been
recognized by the county as private "not only by the plat, but by assessing it and enriching its
own coffers by tribute exacted in the form oftaxes." Wall&tllX (emphasis added).
Relying on the "bona fides of the abutter," the Court finds that the Okelberrys absolutely
believed the roads in question were their private property and as such asserted their ownership
control by erecting fences and issuing trespass permits onto the property and these actions were
uninterrupted by the County for over a decade. Clearly the Okelberrys' reasonably believed the
roads were their property and acted consistent with that belief and the County did not challenge
their belief for a substantial period of time. While erecting fences does not rise to the level of
erecting "large and costly buildings," the Court finds the Okelberrys' improvements and more
importantly their business investments on the land to be significant. Thus, this Court finds that
estoppel may properly asserted against the County.
The County then asserts that the exception to applying estoppel to a governmental entity
is limited to situations where allowing the government to disavow its own affirmative act would

cause grave injustice to the other party and where estoppel may result in the loss of a public road,
the courts have also required substantial conflicting improvements on what has been the road by
the relying land owner. It is true that some cases have indicated that an affirmative action is
required in order to assert estoppel against a government entity. See The View Condo. Assn.,
2004 UT APP 104 at 34, n.2; See also Wall v. Salt Lake City, 168 P. 766, 769 (Utah 1917).
However, this requirement does not appear to have been universally applied by the courts.1
In Premium Oil v. Cedar City 187 P.2d 1999 (Utah 1947), the Utah Supreme Court held
that it is a "general rule" that a "municipality may be estopped to assert a dedication by acts and
conduct which have been relied upon by others to their prejudice." Id. at 203. The Premium Oil
Co, court further held that "in many cases where cities attempt to open dedicated streets for the
benefit of the public, the courts have estopped the city from enforcing a dedication because the
city authorities and the public itself has taken no action over a period of years" to prevent the
private landowner from acting in an otherwise hostile manner. Id. at 204. The Premium Oil
court made no mention of an affirmative action requirement.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court held in Western Kane County Special Service District
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987), that estoppel against the government is
appropriate where the landowner has "substantially altered his position to his detriment in

1

This view is well-supported by the commentators. One respected commentator has thus
noted that though "the application of estoppel doctrines against municipal corporations is not
favored," a municipal corporation is "[nonetheless . .. subject to the rules of estoppel in those
cases where equity and justice require their application." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver
Section 152. Further, "a municipality may be estopped to open or use a street theretofore created,
still existing in point of law, and never opened, or, if once opened in use since fallen into disuse
and seemingly abandoned." 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highway and Streets, and Bridges Section 179; See
Also 11A McQuillen The Law of Municipal Corporations Section 33.62 ("The municipality itself
may be stopped to assert a dedication by acts and conduct which have been relied on by others to
their prejudice.").

reliance on the asserted nonuse of the roadway by the public." Id. at 1378. In Western Kane the
Utah Supreme Court refused to apply equitable estoppel against the government because the
"landowner had not substantially altered his position to his detriment in reliance on the asserted
nonuse of the roadway by the public." Id. The roads in Western Kane were located on the edges
of the property and no more than ten feet wide. The Court did not discuss any evidence that the
landowners had made any improvements, but the Court did mention that the County paid 75
percent of the cost of the land into the court.
Here, the Court finds that "equity and justice" do require the application of estoppel to the
present case. The Okelberrys have acted as if they owned the roads in question for over a decade.
In addition to the time and labor that they have personally spent on these roads, they have also
developed a business relationship with a CWMU-thereby potentially passing on other business
or land development opportunities that may have existed in the interim. To allow the County
now to assert an ownership interest in these roads would cause the Okelberrys injury, would be
unjust, and therefore cannot be sanctioned by this Court.
As such, the Court holds that the County is hereby estopped from asserting an ownership
interest over these roads, and the County's Motion to Amend Judgment is hereby DENTED.
Counsel for the Defendants shall prepare an order consistent with this ruling.

DATED this Jo day of February,^£&§t —^>
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WASATCH COUNTY,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

!

( dse No O105UG38S
Judge Dona d J Eyre

E RAY OKELBERRY, et. al,
Defendants
This Court hereby (I) supplements its findings of fact as was set forth in the
Supplemental Findings ot r a a and Ruling that veto bi^c.cC on Telrdm} 12:h, 20C5. and (II)
denies Plaintiffs Motion to Alter
DATED this

_Sr**«

Judgment
, 2005.
-^B Y THE COURT

Approved as to Form:

Scott H. Sweat
Deputy Wasatch County Attorney

MAILING CERTIFICATE
1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, this

(_ day of March, 2005.

Scou H. Sweat
Wasatch County Attorney
805 West 100 South
Heber City, UT 84032

SECRETAW

NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 7 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given to
Plaintiff, that this proposed order prepared by Defendants shall be the Order of the Court unless
Petitioner files an objection in writing within five (5) days from the date of the service of this
notice.
DATED this ^

_ day of March, 2005

o.

RYAN D. TENNEY
Attorney for the Defendants
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APPENDIX G
Further Specific Findings of Fact and Ruling on Defendants' Motion for
Entry of Supplemental Findings and Conclusions; or Alternatively for New
Trial or Presentation of Additional Evidence, R. 676-668.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OyG" : . . ; , . £ : • . (j

FURTHER SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF
FACT AND RULING ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
Plaintiff,
SUPPLEMENTAL
FINDINGS AND
v.
CONCLUSIONS; OR ALTERNATIVELY
WEST DANIELS LAND ASSOCIATION et al, FOR NEW TRIAL OR PRESENTATION
OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
Respondent.
Case No. 010500388 PR

WASATCH COUNTY,

Judge Donald Eyre, Jr.

This matter comes before the Court on remand from the Utah Supreme Court. In a ruling
filed February 12,2008 (Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT10), the Supreme Court instructed
this Court to enter "specific findings of fact regarding the Okelberrys* evidence of interruption in the
use of the Four Roads as public thoroughfares/* 2008 UT 10 % 20. The Court has reviewed the file,
reviewed trial transcript, considered the memoranda of both parties, heard oral argument, and now
issues the following findings of fact and ruling:
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Several of Plaintiff s witnesses testified at trial that they used some or all of the four roads
(Circle Springs Road, Ridge Line Road, Thorton Hallow Road, Parker Canyon Road) at issue here
during various periods between 1957 and 2004.
2. Deon Sabey testified that he used all four roads several times beginning in the 1950s. He
testified that when using the roads he never saw "no trespassing" signs on any of the roads, but did
see gates on the roads. He never saw or encountered locks on any of the gates. He saw no markers
on the gates. He saw others using the roads at various times, and was never asked to leave the roads,
nor did he get permission to use any of the roads.
3. Moroni Besendorfer testified that he used all four roads several times beginning in the
1960s. He testified that he saw others on the road every year from the 1960s through the 1980s, He
testified that he saw others use the roads and camp on adjoining property with their vehicles. He did
not see any "no trespassing" signs until 1999. He saw no locked gates until "a few years" prior to
the trial. He was never kicked off the roads or asked to leave, and never obtained permission to use

the roads.
4. Martin Wall testified that he used Circle Springs Road and Ridge Line Road regularly
beginning in the 1950s, for hunting and gathering firewood. He testified that he never saw "no
trespassing" signs. He saw gates on the roads, but they were not locked. He never received
permission to traverse the roads.
5. Jake Thompson testified that he has used Circle Springs Road and Ridge Line Road
regularly since the 1950s, and Thorton Hallow Road since at least the 1970s, He testified that he
never saw "no trespassing" signs on the roads. He saw gates, but they were not locked. He never
received permission to travel the roads, and was never kicked off the roads.
6. Ed Sabey testified that he has used all of the roads regularly since about the 1960s. He
testified that he never saw "no trespassing signs," nor signs on Parker Canyon Road saying "no
motorized vehicles." He saw gates, which were not locked. He had seen others on the roads. He
never got permission to use the roads, He testified that about "15 years ago" (which would have
been 1989), people were stopped from using Ridge Line Road.
7. Richard Baum testified that he used Ridge Line Road for biking about "20 years ago"
(1984). He was never kicked off the road, and never saw "no trespassing signs." He did see "orange
painted wood signs" on the road.
8. Brandon Richins testified that he has used Circle Springs Road, Ridge Line Road, and
Parker Canyon Road starting in the late 1980s. He testified that he first saw "no trespassing" signs
about 15-16 years ago (1988-89) on Circle Springs Road. He saw locked gates on Ridge Line Road
since 2001. He never saw locked gates on Parker Canyon road, but saw "no motorized vehicle"
signs. He never had permission to use the roads, and saw others on them.
9. Benny Gardner testified that he started using Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hallow Road,
and Parker Canyon Road in about 1966. He testified that he did not see "no trespassing" signs until
the 1990s. He saw the gates on the roads, but testified that they were not locked until "more
recently." He testified that he saw others on the roads, was never kicked off the roads, and never got
permission to use the roads.
10. Mark Buttars testified that he used all the roads starting in the 1960s, except Parker
Canyon Road, which he started using in 1972. He testified that he saw "partial trespassing" signs
on Thorton Hallow Road and Circle Springs Road starting in about 1992. He saw no signs prior to
1992. He never received permission to use the roads, and saw others on the roads. While he saw
gates on the roads, he testified that they were never locked.
11. Defendants called several witnesses who also testified regarding public access to the
roads between 1957 and 2004.
12. Jeff Jefferson mainly testified regarding the condition of the roads. He testified that each
of the roads was rocky and would require a 4-wheel drive vehicle to pass, but that sometimes gates

were left open. He testified that he asked Mark Buttars to leave the roads twice sometime after 2000.
He also testified that the sign on a lire at the start of Circle Springs Road was put up in about 1992.
13. Melvin Price also testified about the condition of the roads: that they were only passable
by 4-wheel drive vehicles. He testified that there have been locked gates and u no trespassing" signs
on Ridge Line Road for at least 20 years. He testified that there were signs and locked gates on the
odier roads at some poinU but did not specify a time frame. He testified that he got permission from
the Okelberrys each year he used the roads, and that there was not much traffic or many others on
the roads.
14. Lee Okelberry testified that his father purchased property surrounding the roads in 1957.
He testified that the roads had gates and fences. He testified that Thorton Hallow Road and other
roads were "better than a trail," but that the public was not there much in the 1950s. He testified that
he occasionally he stopped and talked to people on Parker Canyon Road in the 1950s. He stated that
u
as the years went by there was a little more traffic" on the roads. He testified that in 1957 there was
no need for "no trespassing" signs because "[t]here was no, not that much trespass up there." He
further stated that there were no locks on the gates in 1957, but instead u [w]e put fasteners on them
and we wired them to a post." "We never did lock anybody out of there," he stated. He testified that
he asked wood gatherers to get ofFprivate land on occasion. He also testified that he "never locked"
the gates. He testified that a locked gate shown to him as an exhibit was "put there after I left."
Finally, he testified that "I think we stood up for the public quite a bit. If there was any that needed
to go through there in any way, shape or form they could ask or they could go through there. We
never turned nobody down that had any business down in there."
15. Glen Shepherd testified that there are now signs on all of the roads. He said he had
permission for years from the Okelberrys to use the roads, who are "pretty free" with giving
permission. He stated that the roads are generally seen as private rather than public roads, and that
there have always been gates of some sort on the roads.
16. Shane Ford testified that the condition of the roads is pretty similar now (in 2004) to their
condition in 1994. He testified that gates are now locked during hunting season. He believed that
the roads have not been open to the public for continuous use.
17. Bruce Huvard testified that the roads were "very rough." He testified that he first went
to the property in 1966, and saw "keep out" and "private" signs on the property at that time. He
testified that he obtained permission from the Okelberrys each year from 1966 to 1990 to use the
roads. He testified that there were always gates upon entering the roads between 1966 and 1990.
He testified that there were others who used the roads without permission, but that they were not
very numerous. He kicked people off the Okelberry property who were not "supposed to be on
there" between 1966 and 1990. He testified that "some" of the gates were locked between 1966 and
1990, but did not specify exact dates.
18. Brian Okelberry testified that he started working on the property around the roads in the
early 1970s. He testified that there have always been gates on the road since he's been there, and
that one of the purposes of the gates was to control vehicles "from going up and down the roads."

He has given people permission to use roads at times. He testified that there were "keep out11 signs
on some of the gates. He testified that some of the gates have been locked "aver periods of time."
He testified that he started taking an active role in preventing trespassing around the late 1980s, and
began putting up signs then. He testified that the first boundary locks were placed on the gates in
the 1980s.
19. Ray Okclberry testified that there were gates on the roads beginning in 1957, and that as
time passed more people came. He has told people to leave the roads "on occasion." He gave
permission to Brian Gardner and others to use the roads. He began charging people for "trespass
permits" beginning in the 1990s. He testified that there were locks on the gates in the 1990s and
2000s. He testified that the sign on the tire at the entrance to the Circle Springs Road was there
"about 20 years." He testified that they started locking the Circle Springs and "1080 gale" (going
into the Ridge Line Road) either the first or second year he was there. He testified that people may
have cut the locks from gates at some points. He testified that he began putting up signs in 1957-59,
but that "they didn't stay up," and hypothesized that the "wind blew them away." He also testified:
T m not saying the gate was opened or locked all summer, but when 1 was getting ready to get those
sheep out of there I locked those gates. And I've always had trouble keeping locks there."
20. The Court finds that there were gates at the entrances to each of the roads from 1957 to
2004.
21. The Court also finds that there may have been signs at various locations reading "keep
out" and "private" beginning in the 1960s. However, the evidence shows that these signs did not
restrict travel on the roads themselves, and it is unclear whether they were intended to refer to
keeping off the roads or the surrounding property. None of Defendants' witnesses clarified whether
the signs were intended to refer to the roads or the property. Ray Okelberry testified that the signs
he placed "didn't do any good" anyway. More signs were placed by Brian Okelberry and others
beginning in the late 1980s and 1990s.
22. The Court finds that occasionally persons may have been told to leave the property
beginning in the 1950s, but this did not restrict travel on the roads. Restrictions on use of the roads
began in the 1980s at the earliest. There was no evidence presented that the Okelberrys regularly
kicked people off the roads at any time before the 1980s; the evidence instead shows that they freely
mlended^to jeU)thers use the roads.
23. The Court finds that while some people obtained permission to use the roads, getting
specific permission was not enforced, and many used the roads from 1957 to the 1990s without
permission.
24. The Court finds that though the Okelberrys may have locked some of the gates at some
points between the 1950s and 1990s, this did not restrict travel on the roads. There was no credible
evidence presented that the Okelberrys intended to or actually did restrict travel prior to the 1990s
due to the locking of gates. While Ray Okelberry testified that he locked gates beginning either in
1957 or 1958, he did not testify that he intended to keep the public from accessing the roads at this
time. Lee Okelberry and Brian Okelberry, both Defendants' witnesses, testified that the boundary

gates at the entrances of the roads were never locked until at least the 1980s. Several of Plaintiff s
witnesses also testified to this effect.
RULING
The issue before the Court here is a fairly narrow one, though it must be decided based on
a large amount of testimony and evidence. The Utah Supreme Court, on February 12,2008, issued
a written decision ordering this Court to enter "specific findings of fact regarding the Okelberrys'
evidence of interruption in the use of the Four Roads as public thoroughfares/1 Wasatch County v.
Okdberry, 2008 UT lO^J 20. This Court has reviewed the evidence and made those specific findings
of fact above, and will presently apply those findings to the now-applicable law.
In its February 12 decision, the Supreme Court articulated a ^bright-line rule" to determine
whether a road is dedicated and abandoned for use to the public under Utah Code Annotated § 72-5104. This rule is as follows:
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to interrupt the use of a road as a
public thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes an interruption
sufficient to restart the running of the required ten-year period under the Dedication
Statute.
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 fl 15.
The new rule thus contains three requirements: 1) there must be an overt act; 2) there must be a show
of intention by a property owner to interrupt the public use of a road; 3) the overt act must be
reasonably calculated to interrupt road use by the public. The Supreme Court explained that
"credible evidence** which meets these three requirements "simply precludes a findingof continuous
use." Id
Defendants argue that they have presented evidence of "at least four types of acts" which
would satisfy the above standard: "locked gates, unlocked gates, asking trespassers to leave, and
posting signs." (Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ("Opp. Memo"), at 2.) The Court now addresses each of these.
The evidence at trial showed clearly that there were unlocked gates at the entrances to the
roads (boundary gates) as well as some interior gates during all the years relevant to this issue. The
question is whedier unlocked gates would satisfy the requirements explained above. The Court holds
that they do not. Defendants argue, using language from various cases in other states, that an
unlocked gate creates a "presumption that any use was permissive." (Opp. Memo, at 11.) But the
testimony at trial shows otherwise. Several witnesses testified of unlocked wire or metal gates which
were used to control cattle, but none testified that this interrupted their use of the roads, or that they
supposed that their use was permissive based on the presence of the gates. Perhaps most
importantly, the simple existence of gates clearly does not constitute an overt act. The gates were
apparently there even before Defendants took control of the property, and the requirement that
travelers open and close such gates for the purpose of controlling livestock does not show intent to
interrupt public use. The gates themselves "were not meant to restrict public travel on the Road[s]."
Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12 % 16.
Defendants claim that "asking people to leave the roads" constitutes an overt act under the
Supreme Court's standard. Indeed, multiple witnesses, including Bruce Huvard, Melvin Price, and
Glen Shepherd testified that they obtained permission to use the roads. Some testimony was also
presented at trial that, on occasion, the Okelberrys and others asked people to leave property

surrounding the roads. The evidence did not show, however, that this interrupted public use of the
roads generally. Several of Plaintiffs witnesses testified that they used the roads freely during the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s without any resistance. Lee Okelberry testified thai the Okelberrys u never
turned nobody down" who had legitimate business using the roads. None of Defendants' witnesses
testified that there was a regular policy of requiring permission or approval to use the roads during
that period, nor that asking persons to leave the property was intended to restrict public access to the
roads themselves. As the Supreme Court stated in Utah County v. Bulkrt when individuals are not
removed from the roads themselves, simply removing them from the adjoining property is not
sufficient to constitute an overt act reasonably calculated to interrupt continuous use. See 200S UT
12 U! 7. The evidence shows that it was not until the late 1980s and 1990s that the Okelberrys began
requiring hunting permits and other permission to use the roads. As a result, the Court finds that
these instances of asking persons to leave the property do not rise to the level of an overt act intended
to interrupt public use of the roads prior to the 1990s.
Another possible interruptive act alleged by Defendants was the posting of "keep out" and
"no trespassing" signs on the gates and the property surrounding the roads. The Utah Supreme Court
has held that "it is clear that the posting of the signs constituted an overt act," but that less clear was
whether posting the signs showed an intent to interrupt public use of the road and whether the act
was reasonably calculated to do so. Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 fl 18. It appears that
a majority of the "no trespassing" and "keep out" signs on the property at the time of trial were
placed there in the late 1980s and 1990s. Ray Okelberry testified that he began putting up signs as
early as 1957 or 1958, but that it "didn't do any good" to put the signs up. He also testified that the
early signs "didn't stay up." Bruce Huvard testified that he saw signs as early as 1966 saying "keep
out" and "private," Yet none of Defendants' witnesses at trial specified their intent when putting up
the signs in the years prior to the 1980s and 1990s. Further, many of Plaintiffs witnesses testified
that they never saw "no trespassing" signs until the late 1980s or 1990s, and that none of them were
deterred in their travels along the roads by signs. The Utah Supreme Court held, in Utah County v.
Butler, that "[s]igns posted against travel on property adjacent to the Road do not constitute an
interruption of travel on the Road itself." 2008 UT 12 % 17. Without credible evidence showing that
the signs were meant to apply to the roads themselves, the Court cannot infer an intent to interrupt
the use of the roads from the posting of signs in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s, nor can it conclude that
the earlier signs were "reasonably calculated" to interrupt public road use prior to the late 1980s or
1990s.
Finally, Defendants submit that evidence of locked gates constitutes an overt act sufficient
to satisfy the Supreme Court's standard. The Supreme Court held that u[t]he locking of gates for
several days at a time constitutes an overt act intended to interrupt public use and reasonably
calculated to do so." Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 fl 19. However, the Court also held
that "factual questions remain as to whether and when such an event or events occurred." Id Ray
Okelberry testified that he started locking the Circle Springs and "1080 gate" (going into the Ridge
Line Road) either the first or second year he was on his property. He testified that "when I was
getting ready to get those sheep out of there I locked those gales." (Transcript of Bench Trial, June
30,2004, at 138.) He also stated that "I've always had trouble keeping locks there," but that "I was
there I might have been there a week or ten days that I had those gates locked." Id at 138-39.
The Utah Supreme Court explained that evidence of an overt act must be "credible" to
preclude a finding of continuous use under the dedication statute. Wasatch County v. Okelberry,
2008 UT 10 H 15. That Court has previously held that a trial court has "the prerogative to judge the

credibility of the witnesses and to determine the facts." Casida v. Detand, 866 P.2d 599,602 (Utah
1993) (citing Hanks v. Turner, 508 P.2d 815, 816 (Utah 1973)). In making this determination, the
Court is "not obliged to believe the self-serving testimony" of the witness. Id. Further, while a trial
judge "should not arbitrarily reject competent, credible, uncontradicted testimony, nevertheless he
is not compelled to believe evidence where there is anything about it which would reasonably justify
refusal to accept it as the facts, and this includes the self-interest of the witness." Id. (citing Strong
v. Turner, 452 P.2d 323,324 (Utah 1969)).
Though the Court properly takes into account Ray Okclberry's self-interest in assessing the
credibility of his testimony, that alone is not dispositive. The main problem with Ray Okelbeny's
trial testimony regarding locked gates is that it contradicts not only the testimony of several of
Plaintiffs' witnesses (specifically, Deon Sabey, Moroni Besendorfer, Martin Wall, Jake Thompson,
Ed Sabey, Brandon Richins, Benny Gardner, and Mark Buttars), it also contradicts the testimony of
Defendants' own witnesses, Brian and Lee Okelberry. Plaintiffs' witnesses who testified on the
issue testified that they encountered no locked gates while using the roads until at least the late 1980s
or 1990s, and some not until the 2000s.
Brian Okelberry testified that thefirstboundary locks were placed on gates in the 1980s. Lee
Okelberry testified that "(w]e never did lock anybody out of there," that he personally never locked
any gates, and that any locks on gates shown to him as exhibits were put there "after I left," which
would have been in the 1990s, as he testified he stopped going to the area "about six years ago."
(Transcript of Bench Trial, June 29,2004, at 198.) He specifically testified that locks were not put
on the gates in 1957, but instead "[w]e put fasteners on them and we wired them to a post." These
statements by Brian and Lee Okelberry are especially significant because they are statements against
interest. Brian Okelberry is a party to this case, and both were witnesses called by Defendants.
Plaintiffs witnesses also contradict Ray Okelberry's testimony. Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs witnesses are usporadic users" of the road and that their testimony regarding locked gates
should not be given as much weight as a result (Opp. Memo, at 9.) But the Supreme Court
explained that "a road may be used continuously even if it is not used constantly or frequently,"
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 ^] 16. "For example, a road may be used by only one
person once a month, but if this use is as often as the public finds it * convenient or necessary/ and
the landowner has taken no action intended and reasonably calculated to interrupt use, the use is
continuous. The one-month period of time between uses is a mere intermission, not an interruption."
Id
The Courtfindsthat while there may have been occasions in which Mr. Okelberry locked the
gates in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, these were few and far between, were not intended to restrict
public access, and were not reasonably calculated to interrupt public use of the roads. The Court
finds that his testimony, to the extent it contradicts the testimony of Lee Okelberry, Brian Okelberry,
and several of Plaintiffs witnesses (that the gates were not locked with that intent until at least the
1980s), is not credible evidence under the Supreme Court's standard. Defendants* other witnesses
testifying about the existence of locked gates did not specify timeframes in which the gates were
locked; therefore the testimony of the Okelberrys are Defendants' only evidence on this subject. As
in Utah County v. Butler, the Court finds here that between the 1950s and at least the 1980s "the
gates . .. were not erected or locked with the requisite intent and therefore did not interrupt the
public's continuous use of the Road." 2008 UT 12 f 16.
CONCLUSION

Tliis Court ruled previously that "it is clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the
late 1950s until the late 1980s or early 1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the roads
freely, and though not constantly, they used the roads continuously as they needed." (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, 22 September 2004, at 6-7.) Plaintiffs at trial made a showing by clear
and convincing evidence that Circle Springs Road, Ridge Line Road, Thorton Hallow Road, and
Parker Canyon Road were abandoned to the public. Defendants have offered no credible evidence
of overt acts sufficient to change this determination under the Utah Supreme Court's newly created
standard. Therefore the Court holds that under Utah Code Annotated § 72-5-104(1) each of the four
roads was "dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public" by continuous use as a public
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